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Comments
POWER PLAY: WHY NHL’S PROHIBITION ON PLAYER
PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE OLYMPICS WOULD
VIOLATE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Hockey League (“NHL”) is the only major Amer-
ican sports league to pause its season in order to allow its players to
compete in the Olympics.1  Yet, the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi,
Russia, potentially marked the final Olympic Games with NHL play-
ers in attendance.2
The NHL has permitted players to compete in the last five Win-
ter Olympics; however, one of the highly contentious issues in the
recent Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) discussions be-
tween the NHL and the National Hockey League Players’ Associa-
tion (“NHLPA”) was the involvement of players in future Winter
Olympics.3  While players relish the opportunity to compete for
their countries, allowing player participation in the Games creates
scheduling problems for the NHL, increases the risk of player inju-
ries, and fails to provide the league any financial benefit.4  Ulti-
1. See James Larry, Wanna Go?: A Discussion of the Potential Fight Between NHL
Owners and Players over Participation in the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, 32 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 3A, 17A (2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law.north
western.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=njilb  (noting three-week
shut down of NHL in middle of its regular season).
2. See Larry, supra note 1, at 9A (describing ownership’s less enthusiastic view-
point of continuing Olympic participation). See also NHL Season To Go On Hold So
Players Can Compete In Sochi 2014 Olympics, CBS NEW YORK (Jul. 19, 2013, 3:20 PM.),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/07/19/nhl-season-to-go-on-hold-so-players-
can-compete-in-sochi-2014-olympics/  (estimating nearly 120 NHL players will play
for international teams).
3. See Ryan Lake, The Games Must Go On: 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games and
the National Hockey League, LAWINSPORT (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.lawinsport
.com/articles/regulation-a-governance/item/the-games-must-go-on-2014-sochi-
winter-olympic-games-and-the-national-hockey-league (noting prior CBA agree-
ments included clauses permitting player involvement in then future 2006 and
2010 winter Olympic games). But see id. (stating current CBA agreement remained
moot on issue but included a clause allowing NHL, NHLPA, IOC, and IIHF to
negotiate a deal for 2014 games).
4. See CBS NEW YORK, supra note 2 (quoting NHL commissioner Gary R
Bettman, “Our outstanding athletes take tremendous pride in representing their
homelands on the global stage”). See also Lake, supra note 3 (“The NHL and R
NHLPA’s hesitation to go to the games was largely due to the rising cost of player
insurance, and restrictions on the NHL’s ability to commercialize their participa-
(227)
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mately, the two sides failed to reach a decision and left the issue in
flux.5
The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”), International
Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”), and National Broadcast Company
(“NBC”), which holds the Olympic television broadcast rights
within the United States, collectively rely on NHL player presence
to increase the Games’ appeal and to generate profits.6  Absent
NHL players, the Winter Olympics’ profitability, marketability, and
mass appeal would collectively diminish.7
The NHL initially allowed player involvement in the Olympic
Games in an attempt to benefit financially from the increased
worldwide exposure.8  However, due to the IOC’s restrictive mar-
keting, advertising, and broadcast guidelines, which effectively ban
outside organizations’ media access and licensing agreements, the
NHL has not successfully translated the added exposure into reve-
nue.9  Because of the IOC restrictions, the League remains unable
to commercialize NHL players’ involvement through any League
sponsored marketing of NHL Olympians, advertising promotions,
or re-broadcasting of full games and highlights.10
On top of the League missing out on potential commercial
benefits, team owners are concerned about Olympic players re-
turning to the NHL season fatigued or even injured.11  As some
tion in the tournament.”). But see Larry, supra note 1, at 18A (“Regardless of their R
willingness to ignore the league’s edict, the players want the league to agree to
continued Olympic participation.”).
5. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing implications stem- R
ming from absence of this contractual language).
6. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussing financial impact of R
having NHL players attend the Winter Olympic Games).
7. See Scott Burnside, Bettman, Fasel Step Up Sideshow, ESPN.com (Feb. 18,
2014, 12:22pm), http://espn.go.com/olympics/winter/2014/icehockey/story/_/
id/10474956/2014-sochi-olympics-future-nhl-players-olympics-debatable (sug-
gesting NHL’s unilateral decision-making process is “part[ ] of the past” and that
IOC should have further say pertaining to future Olympic participation (alteration
added)).
8. See Larry, supra note 1, at 16A-17A (discussing dramatic difference between R
2006 and 2010 NHL Olympic participation).
9. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing IOC’s restrictive R
media stance).
10. See Lake, supra note 3 (“[T]he IOC has traditionally limited the NHL’s R
ability to [market] their participation in the Games.”).  Further, “[owners] have
never been keen about [players] participating in the Olympics [since] [owners]
shut down their league for free, [and owners] don’t think they get the marketing
bump the NHL was looking for when it originally signed up for the Olympics in
1998.” See id. (third and fifth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (footnote
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. See Bob Ford, Olympics a Big Loss for the NHL, PHILLY.COM (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://articles.philly.com/2014-01-31/sports/46833175_1_vancouver-outdoor-
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owners suggest, the potential rise in both injury and fatigue unfairly
benefits NHL teams without Olympians on the roster.12
For these reasons, NHL President, Gary Bettman, and the ma-
jority of league owners do not support sending NHL players to the
2018 or 2022 Olympic Games in South Korea and China, respec-
tively.13  As an alternative to the Olympics, the NHL plans to imple-
ment a World Cup of Hockey, an NHL sponsored quadrennial
tournament held in September during the same years as the Sum-
mer Olympic Games.14
games-olympic-hockey-tournament (noting players returning from Olympic games
to frenzied schedule, increasing chances of player injuries); Rob Vollman, Olympic
Hockey Injuries That Will Have the Biggest Impact When the NHL Returns, BLEACHERRE-
PORT (Feb. 25, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1972002-olympic-
hockey-injuries-that-will-have-the-biggest-impact-when-the-nhl-returns (“The Olym-
pics can be a stressful time for NHL front offices as they watch their most valuable
athletes compete for national glory, but at the risk of getting injured”); Ryan
Dadoun, Fedor Tyutin Suffered Sprained Ankle with Russia, PROHOCKEYTALK (Feb. 22,
2014, 10:41 AM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports.com/2014/02/22/fedor-tyutin-
suffered-sprained-ankle-with-russia/ (stating several noteworthy NHL players were
injured in 2014 Sochi games including “the New York Islanders’ John Tavares
(torn MCL), Rangers’ Mats Zuccarello (fractured hand), Panthers’ Tomas
Kopecky (head) and Aleksander Barkov (knee), and Pittsburgh’s Paul Martin
(hand).”).
12. See Jason Brough, Wings, Blues, and Blackhawks tops with 10 Olympic partici-
pants, PRO HOCKEY TALK (Jan. 7, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://prohockeytalk.nbcsports
.com/2014/01/07/wings-blues-and-blackhawks-tops-with-10-olympic-participants/
(comparing teams like Red Wings, Blues, and Blackhawks—which all sent ten play-
ers to Sochi—with Flames, Panthers, Oilers, Senators, and Predators, which all sent
two players); Josh Smith, The Olympic Effect, THE HOCKEY WRITERS, http://thehock-
eywriters.com/olympic-effect/ (Feb. 20, 2014) (showing that after 2010 Winter
Olympics, NHL Olympians’ points per game average dropped from 1.07 prior to
Games, to .96 points per game after Olympics and by comparison NHL non-
Olympians’ points per game average dropped from .97 to .96 points per game).
13. See Kerry Gillespie, Sochi 2014: Bettman Favours World Cup of Hockey Over
Olympic Participation, SPORTS REPORTER, (Nov. 11, 2013) http://www.thestar.com/
sports/hockey/2013/11/11/sochi_2014_bettman_favours_world_cup_of_hockey_
over_olympic_participation.html (stating Olympic break is an “imperfect solu-
tion,” according to Gary Bettman); Larry Lage, NHL Won’t Commit to Olympics Be-
yond Sochi Games, AP (Jan. 27, 2014, 7:23PM), http://wintergames.ap.org/article/
nhl-wont-commit-olympics-beyond-sochi-games-0  (suggesting lack of appeal for
NHL to allow players to go Olympic games beyond Sochi).  Both destinations pre-
sent fewer opportunities for casual fans to watch hockey games on primetime tele-
vision hours in the United States. See id. (stating that Gold medal rematch between
Canada and US, would occur at 4 pm in Sochi and 7 am or earlier in US).
14. See Gillespie, supra note 13 (“Bettman’s interest in bringing back World R
Cup of Hockey would be better plan going forward.”); Lake, supra note 3 (sug- R
gesting NHL response to strict IOC marketing restrictions sparked “a desire to
expand its international presence through the revitalization of the World Cup and
other potential international tournaments”).
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League representatives announced plans for a World Cup of
Hockey to be held in Toronto in 2016.15  Numerous benefits to the
NHL of hosting the World Cup include: the ability to directly profit
from broadcast, marketing, sponsorship and advertising fees; the
prevention of the hardships involved with pausing a season; and the
full and total control over all aspects of the tournament.16  How-
ever, as suggested by the NHL Commissioner and League Office,
the NHL’s World Cup of Hockey “could spell the end of NHL par-
ticipation at the Olympics[.]”17
As the sole employer to the world’s elite ice hockey players, the
NHL holds considerable leverage over the IOC.18  In order for the
2014 Games to feature NHL players, the League and team owners
stipulated that players would not attend unless the IOC pay
upwards of $10 million in player insurance.19  The League also
pressured the IOC to allow the League unprecedented media ac-
cess for the NHL-owned television station, the NHL Network.20
15. See Chris Peters, Report: World Cup of Hockey Expected to Return in 2016 in
Toronto, CBSSPORTS.COM (Jun. 4, 2014, 8:23pm), http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/
eye-on-hockey/24580740/report-world-cup-of-hockey-expected-to-return-in-2016-
in-toronto (maintaining NHL’s purpose for instituting World Cup of Hockey event
was to “expand [the NHL’s] presence in international hockey, while also having
more control . . . and creating another revenue stream”). See also id. (stating that
NHL and players association would generate estimated $100 million in revenue
through competitive bidding process for any subsequent World Cup of Hockey).
16. See Jeff Klein, NHL and Players Differ Over 2018 Games, NEW YORK TIMES,
(Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/sports/hockey/nhl-and-
players-differ-over-2018-games.html (“Players would still risk injury, but the league
would share in the revenue, travel would be limited, and if played in the preseason,
the tournament would not interfere with the N.H.L. schedule.”). See also Lake,
supra note 3, (“[T]he league expressed a desire to expand its international pres- R
ence through the revitalization of the World Cup. . . .”).
17. See Peters, supra note 15 (alteration added) (replacing Olympics with R
World Cup of Hockey “is believed to be the preferred route of the owners.”).
18. See infra notes 183-198 (discussing market for top professional hockey R
players).
19. See Lake, supra note 3 (“The NHL and the NHLPA believed that the IOC R
should cover the cost of insurance for their players to participate in the Games”)
David Shoalts, NHL, IOC Inch Toward Sochi Winter Olympics, THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(Jun. 24, 2013, 10:27pm), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/nhl-
ioc-inch-toward-sochi-winter-olympics/article12792135/ (forcing IOC and IIHF to
pay record insurance sum restricts IOC and IIHF spending in other areas prior to
Sochi games). See also id. (indicating that due to increased insurance costs, “only
the wealthiest federations, such as Hockey Canada and Hockey USA, may be able
to afford the cost of having their Olympians scrimmage.”).
20. See Lake, supra note 3 (indicating IOC as strictly opposed to granting R
outside media networks access to any portion of Olympics because of restrictive
partnership and broadcasting deals); John Ourand & Christopher Botta, NHL Net-
work on ice, SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Jul. 1, 2013), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily
.com/Journal/Issues/2013/07/01/Media/NHL-Network.aspx (stating that in
2012, NHL’s owned NHL Network, which reached 43 million homes, and charges
4
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The IOC utilizes sponsorship exclusivity deals to generate a major-
ity of its revenue; and, permitting inside access to an outside spon-
sor and partner, like the NHL, threatens those rights.21
Although the IOC appeased the NHL and granted the League
limited access to certain highlights and player access, the League
refused to agree to future Olympics unless given full media access
and control.22  The NHL’s bullish negotiation stance suggests it will
not cease using its leverage over the IOC and IIHF until the organi-
zations relent to the media and control demands or refuse and suf-
fer the prospect of an Olympics without NHL players competing.23
Even if the international organizations comply, the NHL will still
attempt to upstage the IOC by turning the NHL-controlled World
Cup of Hockey into the world’s preeminent ice hockey
tournament.24
If this course of action persists, the League’s conduct of ban-
ning players from the Olympics, but permitting them to attend the
World Cup of Hockey, would violate United States’ primary anti-
twenty-nine cents for subscription raised $53 million in fees for NHL league and
owners).  “NHL Network has turned into a nice business for the league.  It is profit-
able, and league executives expect to see rapid growth[.]” Id.
21. See Tara Clarke, The Companies Spending the Most on 2014 Sochi Olympics –
And What They Really Gain, MONEYMORNING (Feb. 14, 2014), http://moneymorn-
ing.com/2014/02/14/companies-spending-2014-sochi-olympics-really-gain/  (sug-
gesting $1 billion of total revenue for Sochi Olympics generated through exclusive
sponsorship deals). See also id. (stating that in exchange for sponsorship exclusivity
fees, advertisers retain sole right to use Olympic logo in advertising and
marketing).
22. See Lake, supra note 3 (“[B]y keeping the CBA silent on the issue, the
League was able to increase its leverage with the IOC and thereby put the NHL
and NHLPA in a position to negotiate a more favorable agreement.” (alteration
added)); ‘NHL Revealed’ all-access show extends league’s reach to Sochi Olympics, NHL
.COM (Jan. 23, 2014, 5:45pm), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=701888 (“It’s
even more progressive to have inside access at the Olympics, one of the more right-
sholder-controlled events in all of sports.”); see Sharon Terlep, NHL Casts Doubt on
Sending Players to 2018 Olympics, WSJ ONLINE (Jan. 8, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304887104579306522788311320  (suggesting
NHL commissioner and owners infuriated by IOC refusal in 2010 to permit wide-
spread access to NHL Network because they were not permitted to air interview of
NHL commissioner). id. (“The NHL [received] more [broadcasting rights and]
material this year than in 2010 but still can’t air whatever it wants.”).
23. For a detailed discussion of the legality of the NHL’s negotiating stance,
see infra notes 162-173 and accompanying text. R
24. See Lake, supra note 3 (“In response to this, the League expressed a desire R
to expand its international presence through the revitalization of the World
Cup.”); Peters, supra note 15 (suggesting NHL profits could reach as high as $100 R
million from cities bidding on hosting World Cup event). But see Lake, supra note
3 (stating NHL players have a greater interest in being Olympians and further R
noting that men’s hockey is marquee event for Olympics because of NHL player
participation).
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trust legislation, the Sherman Act.25  The Sherman Act attempts to
prevent anticompetitive conduct and the monopolization of mar-
kets and products.26  The Act “ensures that companies which hold a
natural monopoly in a given market do not actively discourage the
rise of similar products in that market.”27
In the present situation, if the League acts to prohibit future
NHL participation in the Olympic Games, the NHL-sponsored
World Cup of Hockey would be an attempt to replace the Winter
Olympics’ prestigious ice hockey tournament.28  Any such ban on
players attending the Olympics will severely impact the IOC’s ability
to attract top-level professional talent, thereby substantially limiting
the ice hockey tournament’s worldwide appeal and profits.29
Therefore, the burdens and consequences stemming from these ac-
tions “would affect players, fans and the business of the Olympics,
but wouldn’t hurt the league itself.”30  Thus, the NHL is using its
role as the employer to the world’s most dominant and profitable
ice hockey players as a means to achieve revenue domination in the
international ice hockey market and extort control over Olympic
organizers.31
This Comment discusses the legality of the NHL’s move to-
wards implementing a quadrennial World Cup of Hockey and the
subsequent banning of players from Olympic competition.32  Part II
25. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); see infra Section IV
(discussing Sherman Antitrust legislation).
26. For a further analysis of the policies that supported the implementation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text. R
27. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 456 (ABC-CILO, 4th ed.
2010).
28. See NHL.COM, supra note 22 (“[If] NHL and the Players’ Association ham- R
mer out a deal for a return of the ‘World Cup of Hockey,’ it’s uncertain what will
happen in regard to participation in the 2018 Olympics” (alteration added)).
29. See Klein, supra note 16.  In a New York Times article, NBC Sports Group R
Chairman Mark Lazarus was quoted as stating the following about his interest in
continuing tradition of NHL players at Olympics: “We’ve expressed that opinion to
the National Hockey League and to the N.H.L. Players Association . . . [w]e can
only tell them that it is our preference, that they’re there.”  See id. (stating further
that NBC, which owns rights to 2018 Winter Games, paid $963 million for right to
air 2018 games, wants players there).
30. Kavitha Davidson, The NHL’s Fraught Olympic Decision, BLOOMBERG VIEW,
(Feb. 26, 2014, 2:26 P.M. EST) http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-02-
26/the-nhl-s-fraught-olympic-decision.
31. See Klein, supra note 16 (“No matter how much the Winter Games raise R
the sport’s visibility in the United States, the league’s owners will weigh that against
their business and competitive interests.”).
32. See Klein, supra note 16 (discussing differing opinions between NHL play- R
ers and league owners and executives, noting player “participation is a joint
decision”).
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provides a background of the relevant entities and the history of
hockey in the Olympics.33  Part III discusses the NHL’s proposed
course of action and reviews the impact of the proposed action.
Part IV discusses the applicable antitrust law: Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.34  Part V applies the Sherman Antitrust Act
to the NHL’s planned actions and suggests that the NHL has mo-
nopoly power over professional hockey players and would violate
the Sherman Act if it prohibited players from playing in the
Olympic tournament and allowed sole permission to instead par-
take in a League-sponsored World Cup of Hockey.35  Part VI as-
sesses the impact on all parties if the NHL executes its plan for
Olympic prohibition and subsequent creation of the World Cup.36
II. BACKGROUND OF ENTITIES AND ISSUES
A. NHL and Winter Olympics
The NHL was formed in 1917 and was originally comprised of
five teams.37  Nearly one hundred years later, the League has ex-
panded to thirty teams and generates over $3.2 billion in annual
revenue.38  The thirty teams are separately owned and operate in
concert with the League office, NHL Enterprises.39  While players
hail from nineteen nations, the majority of the athletes are from
Canada.40  The NHL attracts the elite hockey talent by offering su-
33. For an overview of Olympic ice hockey history, Olympic profits and the
relevant private companies and governing bodies, see infra notes 37-77 and accom- R
panying notes.
34. For a discussion of each entities’ fiscal interests in the Olympics, a sum-
mary of the proposed World Cup of Hockey and an introduction to Sherman Anti-
trust legislation, see infra notes 78-161 and accompanying text. R
35. For a discussion of antitrust implications arising from the proposed World
Cup of Hockey, see infra notes 162-237 and accompanying text.), R
36. For a further analysis of the resulting antitrust violations and a suggested
alternative course of action, see infra notes 238-264 and accompanying text. R
37. See National Hockey League (NHL) Opens its First Season, THIS DAY IN HIS-
TORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/national-hockey-league-nhl-
opens-its-first-season (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (stating NHL was originally five
franchise league).
38. See NHL Projects a $1B Boost in Revenue, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUSINESS
JOURNAL (Jun. 24, 2013), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/
2013/06/24/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/NHL-notebook.aspx (suggesting
within next three seasons’ total revenue will grow another $1 billion).
39. See Larry, supra note 1, at 6A (“Each NHL member club operates individu- R
ally, with its own revenues and costs, and revenues gained on a league-wide basis,
such as television and advertising revenues, distributed among the member
clubs.”). See also id. (stating operating decisions are made by members of each
organization and commissioner of league, Gary Bettman).
40. See Derek Zona, Border Wars: NHL 2012-13 Games Played By Country, SB
NATION (Jul. 30, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.coppernblue.com/2013/7/30/
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perior salaries and competitive playing opportunities compared to
European professional leagues.41  As a result, the League is re-
garded as the premier professional ice hockey league in the
world.42
Before the introduction of NHL players, the Olympic ice
hockey tournament included amateur players and European semi-
professionals.43  In 1988, the IOC lessened the restrictions previ-
ously banning professional athletes from competing in the Olym-
pics.44  Although the Olympics were then open to professionals, the
NHL contractually prohibited its players from competing in non-
NHL games.45  The League softened its position in 1995 due to in-
4570158/border-wars-nhl-2012-13-games-played-by-country  (showing Canada has
highest percentage of NHL players at 52.9%).
41. See Ryan Lambert, What We Learned: The KHL Isn’t Going to Steal All Your
Russians, YAHOO SPORTS (Jul. 13 2013, 10:48 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/
nhl-puck-daddy/learned-khl-isn-t-going-steal-russians-nhl-144857282.html (stating
out of twenty-six teams in Russian Professional Hockey (KHL), only ten could af-
ford to pay $1 million to NHL players to transfer to KHL and only four or five of
total twenty-six teams come up even in revenue per year); Matthew Fisher, KHL is
Good Hockey, Bad Business, NATIONAL POST (Oct. 19, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://
sports.nationalpost.com/2012/10/19/khl-is-good-hockey-bad-business/ (noting
lack of feasibility for KHL to sustain increased player salaries compared to NHL).
42. See Lyle Richardson, KHL Still No Serious Threat to NHL (Feb. 8, 2012, 2:10
PM), http://kuklaskorner.com/spector/comments/khl_still_no_serious_threat_
to_nhl (noting prominent counterpart professional hockey league, KHL, does not
attract high level of players compared to NHL due to KHL’s inability to offer com-
parable salaries).
The KHL, for all the talk that it’s trying to challenge the NHL in some
kind of real way, remains a bit of a joke in terms of who actually plays
there; it’s the equivalent of baseball’s AAA-quality players.  Not quite
good enough to hack it in the bigs, a little too good to be bussing it in the
[NHL’s minor league] AHL.
Lambert, supra note 41 (alteration added). R
43. See Larry, supra note 1, at 9A (discussing Olympic hockey prior to NHL R
participation).
The NHL first allowed its players to participate in the Olympics at the
1998 Games in Nagano, Japan.  Before that, Olympic hockey was effec-
tively an amateur competition. NHL players most recently participated in
2010 Games in Vancouver, and it appears as though the players—espe-
cially the Russian players—desire to play in the 2014 Winter Olympics
held in Sochi, Russia.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
44. See Jamie Fitzpatrick, The Olympic Hockey Timeline, ABOUT.COM, http://
proicehockey.about.com/od/olympichockey/a/olympictimeline.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2014) (stating regardless of ban being removed, NHL owners remained
uninterested at that time in pausing season to permit players to compete).
45. See Larry, supra note 1, at 11A (noting players were able to participate in R
few, non-NHL exhibition games while playing for their foreign teams).
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creasing pressure from players, and agreed to permit the athletes to
take part in the next Olympic Games.46
When NHL players entered Olympic competition in the 1998
Nagano, Japan Winter Games, the popularity of the ice hockey tour-
nament exploded.47  Since then, the ice hockey tournament has
been one of the most watched events of the Olympics.48  The num-
ber of NHL competitors steadily rose over subsequent years, and in
the 2014 Sochi Games, all national teams’ rosters had a percentage
of their players on NHL rosters: USA (100%), Canada (100%), Swe-
den (96%), Finland (68%), Czech Republic (64%), Russia (60%),
Slovenia (56%), Switzerland (36%), Austria (12%), Latvia (4%),
Norway (4%), and Slovenia (4%).49  Overall, nearly 150 NHL play-
ers competed in the Sochi Olympics.50
B. International Participation Process
The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) and the Inter-
national Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”) conduct the Olympic
hockey tournament in tandem.51  The IOC is a non-profit organiza-
tion that “oversees all aspects of the Olympic movement, but its
46. See id. at 11A-12A (noting agreement was reached allowing NHL players to
participate in Olympics after dissolution of Soviet Union and 1994-1995 NHL
player-owner lockout).
47. See Lake, supra note 3 (stating presence of professional hockey players R
from NHL and KHL helped ignite hockey’s worldwide popularity); Larry, supra
note 1, at 11A (suggesting prior to 1998, NHL players who insisted on partaking in R
Olympics could not do so by rule of CBA). The agreement to let players participate
in the 1998 Winter games took place in 1995 between the NHL, NHLPA, IOC, and
IIHF. Id.  For a discussion of the growth in popularity of the ice hockey tourna-
ment, see infra notes 63-66. R
48. See Skiing Tops Olympic TV Viewership, While Hockey Scores Online, THE NIEL-
SEN COMPANY (Feb 19, 2010), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2010/ski-
ing-tops-olympic-tv-viewership-while-hockey-scores-online.html (showing that
during Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics hockey “most discussed Olympic sport
online”).
49. See id. (suggesting percentages increased over sixteen-year period between
1998 and 2014 Olympics due to NHL player involvement).
50. See NHL Won’t Commit to Olympics After Sochi Games, SI.COM, http://www.si
.com/olympic-ice-hockey/ice-hockey/2014/01/27/nhl-sochi-olympics-2018-
pyeongchang (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (noting every team in 2014 Olympics had
at least one player from NHL on roster).
51. See IIHF Mission Statement, INTERNATIONAL ICE HOCKEY FEDERATION, http:/
/www.iihf.com/iihf-home/the-iihf/our-mission.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2014)
(“To govern, develop and promote hockey throughout the world, to develop and
control international ice and in-line hockey . . . to operate in an organized manner
for the good order of the sport.” (alteration added)); The International Olympic Com-
mittee is the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COM-
MITTEE, http://www.olympic.org/about-ioc-institution (last visited Mar. 10, 2014)
(“[t]he International Olympic Committee is the supreme authority of the Olympic
Movement” and organizer to all Olympic games (alteration added)).
9
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most visible role is that of supervisor for the summer and winter
Olympic Games.”52  The IIHF is comprised of national hockey orga-
nizations worldwide with a common goal to broaden the sport’s
popularity.53  For international hockey organizations to send play-
ers to the Olympics, the organizations must be members of the
IIHF and meet the stipulations of the governing body.54  While the
IIHF deals specifically with ice hockey, the IOC is responsible has
final authority and control over arranging and organizing all
Olympic Games.55
For NHL athletes, the Olympic process requires that players
qualify with their respective nation’s IIHF organization and obtain
NHL and team permission through an agreement between the
League and the players union, the NHLPA.56  The NHLPA “negoti-
ates and enforces fair terms and conditions of employment for
NHL players.”57  To achieve the union’s goals, the NHLPA’s repre-
sentatives, the League office, and the team owners enter into a Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which “sets out the terms
and conditions of employment of all professional hockey players
playing in the NHL.”58
In 2012, the League representatives and the players agreed to a
new, ten-year CBA.59  The previous CBA contained terms specifi-
cally permitting the players to compete in the 2006 and 2010 Win-
52. See WONG, supra note 27 at 27 (stating IOC controls administration of all R
Olympic aspects). See id. (“Beneath the IOC administration are the individual in-
ternational federations (IFs). The IFs are nongovernmental bodies given the au-
thority by the IOC to administer specific sports on the international level. IFs must
adhere to the Olympic movement rules and regulations. . .[s]ince the IFs are re-
sponsible for individual sports on an international level, they are directly above the
national governing bodies of each sport. As an example the NGB [National Gov-
erning Body] of basketball in the United States is called USA Basketball.”).
53. See IIHF Mission Statement, supra note 51 and accompanying text. R
54. See Larry, supra note 1, at 8A (indicating further that IIHF operates inter- R
national competitions and settles disputes among member organizations).
55. See IIHF Mission Statement, supra note 51 and accompanying text. R
56. See Inside NHLPA, NHLPA.COM, www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa (last visited
Oct. 2, 2014) (noting NHLPA was initiated in 1967).
57. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE
AND NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N (Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter “NHL 2012
CBA”] available at http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_
2013_CBA.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2014)  (detailing NHL Collective Bargaining
Agreement).
58. See Inside Collective Bargaining Agreement, NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/
inside-nhlpa/collective-bargaining-agreement (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (format-
ting structure of NHLPA with one representative from each of 30 teams who votes
on Executive Director to act as primary liaison between league offices NHL Enter-
prises and players).
59. See NHL 2012 CBA, supra note 57; Larry, supra note 1, at 12A (noting R
prior 2005 CBA expired on September 15, 2004).
10
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ter Olympics.60  However, in the 2012 CBA, the NHL purposefully
negated mention of future Olympics so the League would no
longer be obligated to allow the players to partake in Winter
Games.61  Although the NHLPA and League office can still negoti-
ate the Olympics, without contractual language addressing interna-
tional play within the CBA, players risk competing and possibly
injuring themselves without compensation.62
C. Olympic Ice Hockey Tournament Profits at Stake
The Olympic Ice Hockey tournament generates substantial rev-
enue and viewership compared to the other Winter Olympic
sports.63  In Vancouver 2010, the Olympic hockey tournament por-
tion of the Winter Olympics generated $60 million in revenue for
the IOC.64  In 2010, the final game of the international tournament
reached the largest audience in history for a Canadian hockey
game.65  Similarly, in the 2014 Sochi Games, the semifinal game
between Canada and the United States set a new online streaming
60. See Lake, supra note 3  (citing COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BE- R
TWEEN NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASS’N, § 24.8
(July 22, 2005) [hereinafter “NHL 2005 CBA”] available at http://www.nhl.com/
cba/2005-CBA.pdf) (“[T]he NHL and the NHLPA commit to participate in the
2006 and 2010 Winter Olympics, subject to negotiation of mutually acceptable
terms with the IIHF.”).
61. See NHL 2012 CBA, supra note 57, § 24; Klein, supra note 16  (“[T]he anti- R
Olympic faction among owners and executives has many reasons for saying no to
Pyeongchang, and last week’s roll call of players who were injured at the Sochi
Games touched off a renewed sense of opposition.” (citation omitted)).
62. See Rob Gloster & Eben Novy-Williams, NHL Owners Question Olympics Bene-
fits as Players Want Medals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2014 2:52 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/nhl-owners-question-benefits-of-olympics-as-
players-want-medals.html  (noting “[t]he league and players union together have
to agree on whether [the league] will participate”).
63. See Brennan Barry, Bettman Not to Blame If NHL Bans Olympic Participation,
Midway Madness, MIDWAY MADNESS (Feb. 11, 2013), www.midwaymadness.com/
2013/02/bettman-not-to-blame-if-nhl-bans-olympic-participation/ (noting 2010
Olympic hockey tournament generated over $60 million). But see Brad Epstein,
NHL Players Are What Separates The Winter Olympics From The Summer, NEXT IMPULSE
SPORTS (Feb. 24, 2014) http://nextimpulsesports.com/2014/02/24/nhl-players-
separates-winter-olympics-summer-games/  (suggesting high NBC ratings linked
closely to Olympic Ice Hockey Tournament).  Following the USA loss to Canada in
Sochi, viewership ratings in the United States over the final two days dropped dra-
matically, by nearly 40%. See id.
64. See Barry, supra note 63  (demonstrating substantial revenue earned from R
Olympic hockey tournament, with $8.5 million in profits from 2010 gold medal
game between United States and Canada).
65. See Nicholas Goss, Why 2014 Sochi Olympics Will Give Revitalized NHL Another
Big Boost, BLEACHER REPORT (July 19, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1707486-why-2014-sochi-olympics-will-give-revitalized-nhl-another-big-boost (noting
2010 Olympic hockey final between U.S.A and Canada most watched television
broadcast in Canadian history).
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record of more than 2.1 million viewers.66  For the four-year
Olympic cycle encompassing the 2014 Sochi Games and 2016 Rio
De Janeiro Games the IOC raised nearly $4.1 billion in revenue.67
However, the IOC operates as a non-profit organization, splitting
half of the revenue with the host city, distributing 90% of the re-
maining revenue to fund National Olympic Committee’s, Organiz-
ing Committees, and International Federations, and retaining 10%
revenue for operational and administrative expenditures.68  These
funds must cover all expenses for both the Summer and Winter
games.69 The success of future Winter Games depends on the
Olympic ice hockey tournament, which has proven to be the finan-
cial keystone for a successful and profitable Winter Olympics.70
NBC has a significant financial stake in the Olympic Ice
Hockey tournament, and paid nearly $7.5 billion for the rights to
Winter Olympic Games through 2032, fully expecting NHL players
to participate.71  The competitive edge NHL players provide the
tournament increases viewer interest and proves a dominating fac-
tor supporting NBC’s rationale for paying the substantial fee to
broadcast the Olympics.72  However without the NHL’s continued
involvement in the Winter Games, NBC’s ratings and revenues
66. See NBC Sports Group Sets Streaming Record As More Than 2.1 Million Unique
Users Live Stream Team USA-Canada Men’s Hockey Semifinal, NBC SPORTS GROUP (Feb.
21, 2014), http://nbcsportsgrouppressbox.com/2014/02/21/nbc-sports-group-
sets-streaming-record-as-more-than-2-1-million-unique-users-live-stream-team-usa-
canada-mens-hockey-semifinal/ (observing that hockey game’s streaming audience
reached 2,122,447 people, exceeding 2012 Super Bowl’s 1.2 million person stream
viewership).
67. See David Owen, IOC Broadcasting Revenues Set to Top $4.1 Billion in Sochi-Rio
Quadrennium, INSIDE THE GAMES, (Sept. 9, 2013) http://www.insidethegames.biz/
olympics/1015932-ioc-broadcasting-revenues-set-to-top-4-1-billion-in-sochi-rio-
quadrennium (“This figure compares with a final total of $3.85 billion for the Van-
couver 2010-London 2012 Olympic cycle.”).
68. See id; Gus Lubin & Samuel Blackstone, Meet The Secretive Group Earning $8
Billion From The Olympic Games, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Aug. 7, 2012, 11:29 PM) http://
www.businessinsider.com/finances-of-the-ioc-2012 8?op=1#ixzz3HSm2h6mz  (“The
larger and more popular Summer Games receive a larger share of the money.”).
69. See Lubin & Blackstone, supra note 68 (discussing how IOC not only bring R
in substantial revenue but receives beneficial treatment by localities hoping to se-
cure contracts).
70. For a discussion of the financial implications of abstention, see infra notes
71-77 and accompanying text. R
71. See Phillip Hersh, NBC will remain the Olympic network in the United States,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 7, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-07/
news/chi-nbc-will-remain-the-olympic-network-in-the-united-states-20110607_1_
olympic-network-nbc-s-olympics-usoc-and-ioc (noting NBC paid $963 million for
2018 Winter Games).
72. See Klein, supra note 16 (“Asked what the N.H.L.’s absence from R
Pyeongchang would mean to NBC, [NBC Sports Group Chairman] Lazarus said, ‘I
can’t answer that question, and I hope I won’t ever have to.’” (alteration added));
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would likely decline.73  The NHL seemingly has an interest in ap-
pealing to NBC, as the League and television provider have a sepa-
rate broadcasting deal worth $2 billion over ten years for NBC’s
right to televise NHL regular season and playoff games.74  In spite
of the existing ten-year partnership deal, the NHL’s path towards
player prohibition will diminish NBC’s revenues.75  NBC expressed
concern over the NHL’s potential player restriction and stands to
lose even further profits if the NHL chooses a separate media outlet
to broadcast the inevitable World Cup of Hockey.76  Thus, the fu-
ture popularity and profits for NBC and the IOC will be inherently
linked to the NHL’s decision to permit players to attend or
abstain.77
III. OVERVIEW OF THE NHL’S PRIOR CONDUCT, PROPOSED COURSE
OF ACTION & RAMIFICATIONS FOR IOC, IIHF AND NBC
A. Buildup to Sochi
For NHL athletes to play in the 2014 Olympics, the NHL re-
quired the IOC and IIHF to substantially lower the organizations’
normally rigid guidelines.78  The League demanded the IOC and
participating IIHF national organizations pay nearly $10 million in
insurance coverage for the participating players.79  The IOC and
Epstein, supra note 63 (“But to keep [the tournament successful] the [Olympics] R
will need to keep the NHL stars.  It needs to be elite.”).
73. See Fluto Shinzawa, NBC Will Have a say in NHL Participation, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 23, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2014/02/23/torey-
krug-making-power-play-impact/7lgKqajN8bf8rpFAjSwsmL/story.html (“[I]f ama-
teurs play in 2018, hockey numbers won’t just go down. They’ll drop off Mount
Everest.” (alteration added)).
74. See Bob Condor, NHL, NBC sign record-setting 10-year TV deal, NHL (April 4,
2011, 10:08 PM), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=560238 (noting NBC
and NHL have $200 million annual contract providing NBC rights to broadcast
NHL regular season and playoffs; notably both Olympic and NHL deals were
agreed upon within same calendar year).
75. See Davidson, supra note 30 (“NBC would take a particularly large hit after
spending $4.38 billion for television rights to the Olympics through 2020.”).
76. See Gloster, supra note 62 (indicating NBC’s preference to have NHL play- R
ers in South Korea).
77. See Jake Mann, NBC’s New Olympics Deal: What the Experts Think, THE MOT-
LEY FOOL (May 9, 2014), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/05/09/
are-olympic-sponsorships-a-multi-billion-dollar-bu.aspx (“[F]our of the last six
Olympics to lose money occurred during the winter” (alteration added)).
78. See Lake, supra note 3 (“[T]he NHL and the NHLPA agreed that changes R
from the past agreements with the IOC and IIHF were needed in order for it to
make commercial sense for the NHL to send players to Sochi.” (alteration
added)).
79. See NHL, IOC Inch Toward Sochi Winter Olympics, CARHA HOCKEY http://
www.carhahockey.ca/1040/nhl-ioc-inch-toward-sochi-winter-olympics (last visited
13
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wealthier IIHF federations paid this unprecedented sum, leaving
poorer nations’ hockey federations unable to pay for necessary pre-
Olympic national training camps.80  The NHL also stipulated that
the IOC needed to liberalize their stringent media rights and cover-
age restrictions to permit the NHL Network increased access.81  Al-
though IOC regulations prohibit outside sponsors and media access
to the Olympics, the committee appeased the League offices and
team owners to enable player participation.82  The NHL acknowl-
edged the inducements, but refused to agree to further Olympics,
partially due to the lack of total control over the Olympic ice
hockey tournament.83
B. NHL Player Prohibition and the World Cup of Hockey
The NHL’s proposed prohibition of player involvement and
reinstitution of the World Cup of Hockey, will have lasting implica-
Oct. 20, 2014) (noting direct correlation between rise of player salaries and in-
creased insurance costs).
80. See id. (discussing cost of insuring players).
The cost of insuring the players . . . is such that many of the [national
IIHF] development camps planned for the summer may not have [pre-
Olympic] on-ice practices. Since the camps are held outside the Olym-
pics, the IOC does not pay for the player insurance so only the wealthiest
federations, such as Hockey Canada and Hockey USA, may be able to
afford the cost of having their Olympians scrimmage.
Id.
81. See id. (suggesting other professional leagues would use NHL negotiations
with IOC as precedent for similar leverage to gain media access for their respective
athletes at future Olympics); The Canadian Press, IIHF President Willing to Find ‘So-
lutions’ to Keep NHLers in Olympics: Issues to be Discussed Between IIHF, IOC and NHL,
THE HOCKEY NEWS (Jan 8, 2013 5:23 p.m.), http://www.thehockeynews.com/arti-
cles/49224-IIHF-president-willing-to-find-solutions-to-keep-NHLers-in-Olympics
.html (noting that NHL made attempts to gain access to “tickets, hotels and better
hospitality for team owners [and] to larger things like sponsor recognition and a
loosening of the IOC’s notoriously strict guidelines on images, video and media.”
(alteration added)).
82. See Scott Burnside, NHL Stars Returning to the Olympics, ESPN.COM (July 19,
2013, 7:35 PM ET), http://espn.go.com/olympics/hockey/story/_/id/9492359/
nhl-players-given-nod-play-2014-winter-games-sochi (reporting that NHL demands
included “increased access and enhanced ability to collect and distribute Olympic-
related content on NHL media platforms, and an improved ability to promote the
NHL’s participation in the Winter Olympics.”).
83. See Scott Burnside, Bitman, Fasel Step Up Sideshow, ESPN.COM (Feb. 14,
2014 12:22PM EST), http://espn.go.com/olympics/winter/2014/icehockey/
story/_/id/10474956/2014-sochi-olympics-future-nhl-players-olympics-debatable
(“In terms of the things that are tangible, the requests made by the NHL and the
NHL Players’ Association leading up to the Sochi Games couldn’t have gone bet-
ter.”). For a thorough discussion of the implications arising from the leagues’ as-
sertion of power, see infra notes 162-237 and accompanying text. R
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tions on international hockey and future Winter Olympics.84  To
benefit financially from player involvement in an international
tournament, the NHL has publicly floated plans to hold the World
Cup of Hockey, starting in 2016.85  The World Cup of Hockey was
previously held twice, in 1996 and 2004, with the 2004 tournament
occurring after the NHL began allowing players to attend Winter
Olympics.86  Both tournaments lacked the draw and success gar-
nered by the Olympics, principally due to the lack of prominent
NHL player involvement.87  For the NHL’s elite, the World Cup
represents a secondary tournament for which the international
prestige associated with the Olympics could not be successfully
duplicated.88
However, the League staunchly suggests that a return to the
tournament with an influx of top-level NHL talent would attract
new interest for both participants and viewers.89  Unlike the Olym-
pics, the World Cup would occur in September to avoid overlap-
84. See Dan Ryan, Sochi 2014: Just How “NHL” are the Olympics, SBNATION (Jan
10, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://www.stanleycupofchowder.com/2014/1/10/5296016/
sochi-2014-just-how-nhl-are-the-olympics (discussing increased likelihood of World
Cup of Hockey as replacement for Olympics).
85. See NHL Won’t Commit to Olympics After Sochi Games, SPORTSILLUSTRATED
.COM (Jan 27, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.si.com/olympic-ice-hockey/ice-
hockey/2014/01/27/nhl-sochi-olympics-2018-pyeongchang (“The NHL and NHL
Players’ Association have been in talks about bringing back the World Cup of
Hockey that wouldn’t conflict with the league’s regular season.”); Joe Delessio,
Time for a Hockey World Cup? SPORTSONEARTH.COM (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www
.sportsonearth.com/article/66502878/the-nhl-is-a-reluctant-participant-in-the-
sochi-olympics (“The NHL hates that it’s not in control of such a high-profile
event, particularly when international hockey has the potential to be so
lucrative.”).
86. See Terlep, supra note 22 (suggesting World Cup of Hockey does not gen- R
erate same level of fan and player interest compared to Olympics, largely due to
NHL players disinterest and lack of involvement).
87. See Christopher Botta, Could World Cup of Hockey Make a Return, STREET &
SMITH’S SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL (June, 25, 2012), http://m.sportsbusinessdaily
.com/Journal/Issues/2012/06/25/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/Hockey-world-
cup.aspx (explaining that NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman believes resurgent
World Cup will be different than previous ones because “both the league and the
[NHL] Players’ Association believe doing World Cups on a regular basis is both
important and a great opportunity for the continued growth of the game” (altera-
tion in original)).
88. See James Conley, The NHL World Cup of Hockey Is Coming for Your Olympics,
SB NATION (Feb. 11, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.pensburgh.com/2014/2/11/
5400344/the-nhl-world-cup-of-hockey-is-coming-for-your-olympics-tuesday-slew
(“The Olympics are [sic] the preeminent international sporting tournament, and
it would take years of successful and captivating World Cup tournaments to really
replace them [sic] in the eyes of hockey fans and NHL players.”).
89. See id. (recounting that return of World Cup of Hockey with NHL player
participation would attract global audience similar to Olympics).
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ping with an ongoing NHL season.90  Additionally, whereas the
international hockey tournament is only one of fifteen sports at the
Winter Olympics, the World Cup of Hockey would not have any risk
of popular winter sports competing with the World Cup for televi-
sion airtime and popularity.91  Further, the NHL would be able to
broadcast the tournament and choose sponsorships and media
rights, with all profits going to the League and the players.92  There-
fore, by substituting the Olympic Games with a World Cup of
Hockey, the NHL and team owners will have an international tour-
nament “they can own, control and profit from.”93  In so doing, the
NHL intends to “make a resurrected World Cup of Hockey the pin-
nacle of the game at the international level.”94
The players, through the NHLPA, must collectively vote and
agree to attend the World Cup.95  Any agreement between the NHL
and its players may offer the players a fiscal incentive based on mar-
keting and television revenues to lure players into attending the
reinstituted World Cup; however, each individual player would re-
tain the option to participate.96  Although there may be a nominal
financial reward, the star players would be unlikely to attend the
90. See Botta, supra note 87 (quoting NHL Chief Operations Officer John Col-
lins as stating  “[f]or years now, we have been essentially licensing our players to
the Olympics and to the World Championships. Why not continue to build up an
event like the World Cup, where the NHL and union can be partners, our spon-
sors can activate, and [that] our fans will embrace?” (alteration added)).
91. See Lage, supra note 13, (altering timetable and schedule of World Cup of R
Hockey would allow NHL to hold event in August or September, outside of winter
sports calendar); Botta, supra note 87, (holding World Cup in September NHL R
hopes to directly benefit from ratings boost due to lull in sporting events between
Super Bowl and NCAA March Madness).
92. See Botta, supra note 87, (believing league does not benefit as much from R
exposure of NHL players, particularly when Olympics are not in North America).
The fan focus and interest boosted post-Olympic ratings when the games were
held in Salt Lake City in 2002 and Vancouver in 2010.  Id. (holding conversely, the
1998 Nagano, Japan and 2006 Turin, Italy Olympics each had lower ratings and
press coverage in the United States).
93. See Greg Wyshynski, Gary Bettman’s World Cup vs. the Winter Olympics, YAHOO
SPORTS (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/puck-daddy/
gary-bettman-world-cup-vs-winter-olympics-202502902—nhl.html (arguing
Bettman views NHL’s player participation concession as “goodwill gesture” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
94. Mitchell Tierney, Why Hockey is the Best Olympic Team Sport, LASTWORDON-
SPORTS.COM (Jan. 29, 2014), http://lastwordonsports.com/2014/01/29/why-ice-
hockey-is-the-best-olympic-team-sport/ (discussing ramifications if World Cup sup-
plants Olympics and NHL refuses to allow players in 2018 Winter Olympics).
95. For a discussion of the NHL and NHLPA agreement to create a World
Cup of Hockey, see supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. R
96. For a discussion of the NHLPA’s lack of power to compel players to attend
a potential World Cup of Hockey, see infra notes 166-167. R
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World Cup, resulting in fewer elite players than the Olympics.97
While the League likely is mistaking the player interest level, the
World Cup reintroduction coupled with the Olympics, demon-
strates a shift toward the NHL dominating the landscape of interna-
tional ice hockey.98
C. The Ramifications for Future Olympic Games
The fiscal and competitive interest for the future of the
Olympic hockey tournament is closely tied to NHL participation.99
A successful NHL player ban would force the IIHF and IOC to find
replacement players in the form of “second-tier pros from the
North American minor leagues and European pro leagues[.]”100
Without the world’s best hockey players the Olympic ice hockey
tournament would diminish from a popularity and marketing
standpoint because “there really is no better way to grow and pro-
mote a game that is often seen as an afterthought among many
sports fans” than by showcasing top level talent.101
Any diminished popularity of the Olympic ice hockey tourna-
ment would directly impact the profits wrought by both the IOC
and NBC.102  By comparison, in the Summer Olympic Games, the
97. See Delessio, supra note 85 (suggesting elite level players would not be R
incentivized by World Cup of Hockey because “such a tournament would . . . have
less cachet, and considering this generation of players has grown up with NHL
Olympic participation—and has likely dreamed about representing their coun-
try—a World Cup could be perceived as a step down” (alteration added)).
98. See id. (“[S]kipping the Olympics in favor of a World Cup would mean a
tournament with fewer eyeballs on it, and one with far less buzz, even if the United
States is successful.” (alteration added)).
99. See Cam Cole, Cole: NHL Plays Coy on its Olympic Future, CANADA.COM (Feb
18, 2014, 10:54 AM), http://www.canada.com/olympics/news/bettman-says-no-
discussions-yet-about-nhl-participating-in-2018-olympics (“[T]he IIHF desperately
needs the NHL in the Olympics, and the NHL — though it has sent the cream of
its workforce to five straight Games beginning at Nagano in 1998 — is very much
divided on whether it’s going to make it six.” (alteration added)).
100. See id. (alteration added) (suggesting decreased and muted fan interest
as result of NHL refusing to permit players to attend 2018 Games in Pyeonchang,
South Korea).
101. See Tim Kolupanowich, The Necessary Presence of NHL Players At the Olym-
pics, THEGOODPOINT.COM (Apr. 16, 2013), http://thegoodpoint.com/nhl-players-
olympics/. See also Katie Carrera, Alex Ovechkin, Steve Stamkos on Why NHL Players
Should Participate in Olympics, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capitals-insider/wp/2013/02/14/the-argument-for-
nhl-players-to-participate-in-the-olympics/ (quoting former Olympian and NHL
All-Star Steve Yzerman “[t]he Olympics is the one time the whole world is watch-
ing, and I believe we want our players there because we have the best players in the
world”(alteration added)).
102. See ALAIN FERRAND, JEAN-LOUP CHAPPELET & BENOIˆT SE´GUIN, OLYMPIC
MARKETING 235 (2012) (“The example of the NHL clearly illustrates one of the key
challenges for IOC marketing and its stakeholders. The stakes are high because it
17
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IOC tends to generate substantial revenue and popularity because
NBA players participate, adding a celebrity aspect to the Games,
and, in return, the NBA receives exposure and increased worldwide
viewership during the regular season.103  Due to the added expo-
sure, “[a]s a business and as a brand, the NBA has generated hun-
dreds of millions of dollars as a direct result of allowing its players
to appear in the Olympic Games[.]”104  Even so, the Summer
Games are not as fiscally dependent on basketball due to the popu-
larity of swimming, gymnastics, and track and field.105  On the con-
trary the Winter Games features less popular, less common sports
and relies on the Olympic ice hockey tournament to generate prof-
its.106  The identifiable and popular stars from both the NHL and
NBA provide the allure for their respective Olympic tournaments
and are primarily responsible for the financial success of those
events.107
The future success of the Winter Games relies on NHL talent,
and “NHL players not attending would hurt the business of the
is important for the IOC’s brand equity to have the best athletes compete in the
Games.”). See also Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Owners Want to Kill Olympic Format to
Protect Investment in International Players, YAHOO!SPORTS (July 29, 2012, 7:10 PM),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/olympics—nba-owners-want-to-kill-olympic-format-
to-protect-investment-in-international-players.html (noting National Basketball As-
sociation permits players to participate in Summer Games which “deliver[s] in-
credible revenue and value to the Olympic basketball tournament” (alteration
added)).
103. See Alex Davidlow, Olympic Basketball: Mark Cuban, David Stern Want IOC to
Wake Up from Dream Teams, BLEACHER REPORT (August 9, 2012), http://bleacherre-
port.com/articles/1290379-olympic-basketball-mark-cuban-david-stern-want-ioc-to-
wake-up-from-dream-teams (stating “the IOC makes a significant portion of its rev-
enue profiting off of Team USA[ because] . . . . [b]asketball is one of the biggest
attractions at the Olympics”).
104. See Howard Bloom, NBA Should Think Twice Before Trashing Role in Interna-
tional Hoops, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014, 2:08 PM), http://www.sportingnews
.com/nba/story/2014-08-05/nba-olympics-ioc-paul-george-injury-update-usa-fiba-
pacers-contract-salary.
105. See Stephen A. Greyser & Vadim Kogan, NBC and the 2012 London Olym-
pics: Unexpected Success 7 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-028 2013),
available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-028_99a0100c-
7dcc-4fc4-bf29-6c0bd2f5561d.pdf (noting Summer Olympics have more popular
relatable sports while Winter Olympics offers sports which are “more regional in
their appeal”).
106. See id. at 7 (suggesting importance of ice hockey paramount to success of
Winter Games because “Winter Olympics do[ ] not carry the same cachet as the
Summer Olympics, [and] the overall return for advertisers is diminished”).
107. See Michael Rosenberg, What the Loss of NHL Players Would Mean to the
Winter Olympics, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM (Feb. 23, 2014), http://olympics.si.com/
olympic-ice-hockey/2014/02/23/sochi-olympics-hockey-nhl-players-out-2018 (“If
you want to hold a major sporting event, you need some recognizable sports . . . .
[b]ut if this becomes a second-rate hockey tournament, then . . . the air will be
sucked out of the Olympics.”).
18
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Olympics and . . . NBC network”.108  Absent the top-tier talent, the
IOC Olympic Committee will face challenges in marketing the
Olympic hockey tournament because “the ability of [the IOC] to
[create] value would be diminished if the best athletes did not par-
ticipate.”109  Consequently, the IOC and NBC are increasingly reli-
ant on keeping NHL players involved in future Winter Olympics.110
Any future absence of NHL players will weaken the product, popu-
larity, and revenue of the Olympic ice hockey tournament as well as
the Winter Olympics collectively.111
IV. SHERMAN ANTITRUST SECTIONS ONE AND TWO
A. Background of Relevant Sections
In the late nineteenth century, Congress enacted the Sherman
Act to foster competition and diminish the existence of monopo-
lies.112  Fearful of a single group or entity controlling and dominat-
108. See Rob Gloster & Eben Novy-Williams, NHL Owners Question Olympics
Benefits as Players Want Medals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2014, 2:52 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-25/nhl-owners-question-benefits-of-olympics-as-
players-want-medals.html  (alteration added) (quoting Brad Adgate, Horizon Me-
dia Inc. Director of Research, as opining that regardless of viewership of Olympics,
NHL should not expect direct regular season ratings to drastically rise because
“[t]here’s no halo effect, . . . [i]t’s not like suddenly 25-plus million people
watched this, so we’ll have 25-plus million people watch the Stanley Cup Finals.
That hasn’t happened.”).
109. See FERRAND, CHAPPELET & SE´GUIN , supra note 102, at 235 (discussing R
potential lack of player participation). See also Michael Willhoft, Should NHL Players
Be Allowed To Play in the Olympics?, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, http://eyesonisles
.com/2014/02/20/nhl-players-allowed-play-olympics/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014)
(noting unlikelihood of TV broadcasts drawing same audience if amateur athletes
replaced NHL players).
110. See Willhoft, supra note 109 (arguing IIHF and IOC rely on NHL players R
because “having NHL players in the Olympic tournament creates the highest possi-
ble level of competition in a marquee event”).  See also id. (adding without talent
display “it’s unlikely those TV broadcasts would draw that type of crowd”).
111. See Ryan Lake, The Games Must Go On: 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games
and the National Hockey League, n.11 LAWINSPORT (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.lawin-
sport.com/articles/regulation-a-governance/item/the-games-must-go-on-2014-
sochi-winter-olympic-games-and-the-national-hockey-league#references.
The inclusion of NHL players has increased viewership of the Olympic
Tournament drastically. For example, in the 1992 Albertville Winter
Olympics, which did not include NHL players, the tournament enjoyed
11.7 million viewers.  However, the 2002 Salt Lake City Games and the
Vancouver Games, which did included NHL players, enjoyed ratings of
17.1 million and 27.6 million respectively.
Id. n.11 (citing Kevin Allen, College Kids Perform Olympic Miracle, ESPNCLASSIC,
http://espn.go.com/classic/s/miracle_ice_1980.html).
112. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1 (2004) (declaring ille-
gal contracts and agreements “in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations”). See also WONG, supra note 27, at 453 (discussing R
origins of antitrust law in United States).
19
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ing a products’ market, the government created the Act to protect
consumers against a singular power restricting free trade.113  In es-
sence, the law exists to “promote competition and condemn coop-
eration among competitors.”114  The policy for antitrust is to
prevent a business or group of businesses working to reduce an
open market and to diminish consumer freedoms.115
B. How to Apply Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2
In the context of sports, claims against major leagues are
brought under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.116  Sec-
tion 1 generally states, “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several State, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”117  The policy behind Sec-
tion 1 “prohibits anticompetitive behaviors in labor markets, such
as in markets for professional athlete services.”118  Courts have in-
terpreted this Section by holding it unlawful for the sole profes-
sional league in a “circuit of events [or] sport to put a fledgling
competing league or circuit of events in that same sport out of busi-
ness by means of improper conduct[.]”119  As such, the Act’s goal in
the professional sports setting attempts to prevent individually
113. See WONG, supra note 27, at 453 (acknowledging that every state has since R
passed legislation closely aligned to Sherman Act, however pertaining to sports
industry, antitrust suits brought under federal act “due to the interstate travel by
teams and television and radio broadcasting across state lines.  However, if a sport
league operates solely within a particular state’s borders, then the state antitrust
laws will be applicable.”).
114. See Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Bal-
ancing Scales after Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C.D. L. REV. 1221, 1227
(2012) (hereinafter “Feldman I”) (discussing origins of antitrust law in sports). See
generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1 (2004).
115. See Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement” Risks of
Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 403,
413 (2009) (commenting that “reduction in freedom of choice is ‘especially troub-
ling because the consumer loses the opportunity to use purchasing power to indi-
cate a preference for boycotted products, materials, or labor sources.’” (quoting
Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Age/Education Require-
ment from a Legal, Ethical, and Cultural Perspective: Women, Men and the Professional
Sports Landscape, 3 NW J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, ¶¶ 35-36 (2008))).
116. See WONG, supra note 27, at 453 (stating only applicable antitrust claims R
brought against professional sports leagues fall under Sections One and Two).
117. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1 (2004).
118. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 413 (citation omitted). “Enacted R
in 1890, during the rise of big business, the Sherman Act was intended to serve
both political and economic purposes and to prevent any one business from be-
coming more powerful than the government.” Id. at 412 n.58 (citation omitted).
119. See MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO, SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 470 (2nd
ed. 2007) (positing that dominant league cannot use unfair business practices to
gain monopoly power or act in “unreasonable, predatory, or exclusionary ways” ).
20
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owned and operated competitors or leagues “from combining their
economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm
consumers[.]”120  However, if franchises, teams, or clubs act in co-
ordination as a ‘single-entity’, then Section 1 analysis is inapplica-
ble, because the Section requires multiple competitors to act anti-
competitively in unison.121
Section 2 guards against the attempted monopolization of a
market.122 It states, “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony[.]”123  Section 2 does not contain the same multi-
ple entities requirement as in Section 1.124  Rather, it permits that
major sports leagues “behave as single entities when they form
120. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 735-36 (2010) (alteration added) (including
examples outside of sports such as coordinating “increased prices, diminished
quality, limited choices, or impaired technological progress” (footnote omitted)
(citations omitted)).
121. See generally American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S.
183, 204 (2010) (holding NFL teams unable to claim single entity status). In Ameri-
can Needle, the NFL claimed the league was immune from Section One because the
30 club teams were acting as a single entity when licensing intellectual property
exclusively to certain retail suppliers. See id. at 185-84 (discussing NFL’s argument).
The Court held that “[e]ach of the teams is a substantial, independently owned,
and independently managed business. ‘[T]heir general corporate actions are
guided or determined’ by ‘separate corporate consciousnesses,’ and ‘[t]heir objec-
tives are’ not ‘common.’” See id. at 197 (first alteration added) (citations omitted).
See also McCann, supra note 120, at 735-36 (suggesting other leagues’ attempts will R
typically fail under such analysis per Supreme Court’s decision against NFL in
American Needle).
122. See WONG, supra note 27, at 455 (describing Section Two as prohibiting R
“unilateral monopolization”).
123. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 2 (2004).
124. See Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for
Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a Flawed
Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 842 (hereinafter “Feldman II”) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Feldman provides the following explanation of how the Sherman Act’s
multiple entity requirement aids parties asserting certain antitrust claims:
The concerted-unilateral distinction between Section 1 and Section 2 is
critical, because it can be significantly easier to prove a violation of Sec-
tion 1 than a violation of Section 2. The unilateral actions of a single firm
are governed solely by Section 2 and are unlawful only if the firm threat-
ens actual monopolization. In contrast, concerted actions between multi-
ple entities are governed by Section 1 and are unlawful if the
anticompetitive effects of the conduct outweigh its procompetitive bene-
fits. It is not necessary for purposes of Section 1 to prove that that the
concerted actions of the firms threaten monopolization. A firm treated as
a single entity instead of multiple entities therefore has a greater chance
of avoiding antitrust liability.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
21
O'Neill: Power Play: Why NHL's Prohibition on Player Participation in Futu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 132 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 132 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS106.txt unknown Seq: 22 31-MAR-15 12:42
248 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 227
schedules, negotiate national television contracts, negotiate league-
wide sponsorships, arrange for player drafts, and revenue
sharing.”125
However, leagues acting beyond the scope of legislative intent
may be liable for antitrust monopolization claims.126  In order to
prove the existence or attempted creation of a monopoly, a plaintiff
must show “the possession of monopoly market power and the use
of unacceptable means to acquire, entrench, or maintain that mar-
ket power.”127  Leagues dominating a market gained by means of
superior quality products cannot increase their power over the mar-
ket through the use of “predatory or exclusionary tactics.”128
C. Review of Applicable Antitrust Tests
An antitrust review of a plaintiff’s claim against a professional
league will generally fall subject to one of three applicable tests cre-
ated by the Supreme Court: a per se test, a rule of reason analysis, or
a quick-look approach.129  The court will apply the tests after re-
viewing proof of “agreements that constitutes an unreasonable re-
straint on trade [based] upon the nature of the challenged
conduct” or evidence demonstrating a monopoly power.130
Under Section 1 analysis, if conduct is “ ‘so pernicious that [it
has] no redeeming value,’ a court will apply the per se test” and as-
125. See Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining Power Vis-a-
Vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280, 293 (2003) (footnotes omitted)
(citations omitted) (citing multiple sources supporting idea that leagues need to
operate uniformly).
126. See Edelman, supra note 125, at  294 n.120 (“If each professional sports
league is considered a single-entity and the court determines the product market is
sport-exclusive, then courts would find each of the four, professional sports
leagues to have monopolies.”).
127. See WONG, supra note 27, at 455 (discussing elements to prove monopoly R
claim against professional sports leagues).
128. See WONG, supra note 27, at 456 n.2 (indicating that examples of preda- R
tory tactics would involve professional sports league expanding into rival league’s
territory in attempt to lower rival’s fan and media support). See id. (observing that
second example suggests established league cannot increase the number of roster
slots open to potential players upon the creation of a rival league in the same area
as means to preclude rival league from filling spots with similarly talented
athletes).
129. See Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Age/Educa-
tion Requirement from a Legal, Ethical, and Cultural Perspective: Women, Men, and the
Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 40 (2008) (citing Cal. Den-
tal Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 763-64, 770 (1999)).
130. See WONG, supra note 27, at 453, 453-57 (noting review of defendant’s R
actions conducted under Section One analysis).
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sume the conduct violates antitrust doctrine.131  Under a per se ap-
proach, plaintiffs must prove: “[1] The existence of an agreement
among two or more distinct persons or entities[,] [2] [t]he activity
unreasonably restrains trade[, and 3] [t]he activity affects interstate
commerce.”132  This test “facilitates legal certainty and promotes ju-
dicial economy,” for it involves common violations including price-
fixing or group boycotts.133  Often violations in this manner will be
apparent at the outset of the court’s inquiry and require minimal
research or findings.134  Therefore, a court will only apply this test if
the legality of the action is facially illegal or frequently ques-
tioned.135  In per se analyses, courts will not analyze the rationales or
defenses of the actions because of the presumptively illegal nature
of the conduct.136
If a court does not believe a violation is sufficiently egregious
to warrant the per se test, then the court will apply a rule of reason
analysis.137  The rule of reason test determines a violation by evalu-
ating the “market power,” “anticompetitive effects,” and “harm.”138
131. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 413 (alteration in original) (cit- R
ing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 140, 224 n.59 (1940)).
132. See WONG, supra note 27, at 453 (requiring interstate commerce permits R
claims against all major sports leagues while restricting claims against smaller intra-
state amateur leagues).
133. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 (internal quotation marks R
omitted) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (arguing courts are moving away
from applying per se test because of low level of scrutiny).  Instead, the majority of
courts have begun moving instead towards application of quick-look or rational
rule test. See id.
134. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 (discussing courts’ familiar- R
ity with certain agreements that are generally accepted as illegal).  “[A]s the courts
gained experience with antitrust problems[,] they identified certain types of agree-
ments which were so consistently unreasonable that they could be deemed illegal
per se, without elaborate inquiry into their purported justifications.” Edelman &
Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 n.70 (alterations in original) (quoting Smith v. Pro R
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
135. See James J. LaRocca, No Trust at the NFL: League’s Network Passes Rule of
Reason Analysis, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV 87, 93 (2008) (noting per se approach is
applied less frequently due to complexity of antitrust claims and lack of facially
invalid actions).
136. See WONG, supra note 27, at 454 (stating defendants will urge courts to R
apply more lenient approaches, commonly the rule of reason, and exclude the per
se approach). Applying the rule of reason allows defendants to justify business ac-
tions and shifts the burden back to the plaintiff. See id. (discussing rule of reason
approach).
137. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 414 (noting that “full economic R
investigation” is done by the court to dissect whether illegal conduct was involved
(citations omitted)).
138. See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 129, at 39 (citing 54 AM. JUR. 2D R
Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 49 (2007)).
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Thus, a court applying the rule of reason test will primarily deter-
mine whether the defendant’s actions assist competitive results or
promote anti-competition.139  Distinct from the per se approach, the
rule of reason test permits justifications of actions so long as the
conduct is necessary and the least restrictive way to “achieve a legiti-
mate business purpose.”140  Courts apply the rule of reason analysis
frequently, because it thoroughly reviews and analyzes rationaliza-
tions to determine whether a defendant’s anticompetitive actions
are outweighed by the pro-competitive benefits.141
Lastly, a subset of the rule of reason analysis, the quick-look, or
truncated rule of reason test, applies when conduct “is neither com-
pletely pernicious nor completely ambiguous.”142  This lower level
of scrutiny applies when conduct or business tactics are not per se
unlawful but the conduct promotes anticompetitive outcomes.143  A
court applying this standard of review will not need to fulfill the
exhaustive requirements necessary in a rule of reason analysis be-
cause the conduct in question frequently harms competition.144
Section 2 analysis differs because it does not have the same
multiple entity requirements as Section 1.145  Under Section 2, the
court will determine the relevant market of the product and
whether the defendant attempted to monopolize or restrict com-
139. See WONG, supra note 27, at 454 (noting to prove a violation under rule R
of reason plaintiff must demonstrate the following three elements: “1. There is an
agreement between two separate entities.  2. The agreement adversely affects com-
petition in a relevant market.  3. The anticompetitive effects of the agreement out-
weigh the procompetitive effects.”).
140. See id. (noting absence of conduct would be detriment to defendant’s
business causing harm to customers).
141. See LaRocca, supra note 135, at 92-95 (discussing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents R
of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) and Court’s holding that antitrust review of
professional sports leagues requires higher level of scrutiny than “quick look” re-
view permits due to inherently complex business practices).
142. See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 129, at 40 (discussing quick look test R
(citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 763-64, 770 (1999))).
143. See Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 763 (citing the Ninth Circuit’s allowing
courts to identify easily discernable, not unlawful, actions, such as general re-
straints on prices, to dissuade competitors).
144. See Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers And Golf Clubs: A
Quick Look at Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, 24 ANTITRUST 40, 40 (2010), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/
oliver_Anti_Spring2010_8.authcheckdam.pdf (noting burden of proof shifts to de-
fendant to prove precompetitive justification for conduct in question). If in fact
the conduct can be plausibly justified then the court must undergo a rule of rea-
son analysis. See id. (discussing burden shifting for applying different standards of
review).
145. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text. R
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petitor access to the market.146  Claimants will often allege both
Section 1 and Section 2 violations because of the similar need to
determine the relevant market.147
D. Clayton Act Exemption for Professional Sports Leagues
Following introduction of the Sherman Act, Congress passed
the Clayton Act in 1914, which exempted labor unions from anti-
trust law, so employers and employees could conduct business with-
out restrictions.148  Section Six of the Clayton Act holds, in
pertinent part that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain individual mem-
bers of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or
the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.149
The purpose of the Act is to protect labor organizations by
preventing employers from adopting antitrust regulations, which
seek to unravel the union’s collective bargaining power.150
146. See WONG, supra note 27, at 455 (“It is important to note that monopoly R
market power is different from market share.  A product may be superior to its
competition and, for good reason, would hold a larger market share.”).  For a
discussion of why the market share analysis would fail, see infra notes 205-208 and R
accompanying text.
147. See generally WONG, supra note 27, at 453-56 (noting overlap in analysis R
conducted by courts).
148. See WONG, supra note 27, at 457 (illustrating need for Clayton Act to R
counteract allegations made by labor unions).  The Clayton Act was not applied to
professional sports teams until early in the twentieth century. See id. at 458;
Johnathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming the Bench: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in
the National Football League, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1205 n.15 (1993) (“Before
passage of the Clayton and Norris-Laguardia Acts, employers argued, and courts
agreed, that the antitrust laws should be used to strike down union activity as an
unlawful restraint of trade.” (citing BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WITNEY, U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS LAW 38 (1992))).
149. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914); 15 U.S.C.A § 17 (West
2014).
150. See WONG, supra note 27, at 457 (noting need for labor unions’ R
protection).
These laws would otherwise restrict, as a restraint of trade, the concerted
activities that union members regularly practice during collective bargain-
ing with employers.  This statutory exemption does not, however, simi-
25
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The Clayton Act applies uniquely to professional sports due to
the nontraditional business formats of professional leagues.151  Yet,
leagues can use the Act to potentially bar antitrust claims.152  Cus-
tomarily, antitrust claims are not initiated against conduct involving
the league and its players because of the unique employer-em-
ployee relationship, in this case the league and its players’ associa-
tion.153  Since the nontraditional aspects of sports leagues require
some form of coordinating and negotiating, professional leagues
are given more leeway than other types of labor unions.154
Typically, professional leagues can claim either the statutory
exemption per Section Six of the Clayton Act or plead a common
law non-statutory exemption defense.155  Generally, the former in-
volves the leagues bringing suits against the players’ associations for
unfair business practices, such as picketing and striking.156  The lat-
ter involves applying a culmination of common law antitrust law to
larly [operate between union and nonunion parties].  Consequently,
employers are not free to engage in anti-competitive activity that violates
the Sherman Antitrust Act simply because they are bargaining with
unions.
Shapiro, supra note 144, at 1206 (alteration added) (footnotes omitted) (citations
omitted) (discussing collective bargaining).
151. See generally Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (exempting certain
labor unions from Sherman Act).
152. See WONG, supra note 27, at 458-59 (noting that statutory exemption was R
typically reserved for sole benefit of labor unions and not leagues, “because the
common interpretation of Section 6 of the Clayton Act is that the law was enacted
solely for the benefit of labor unions[ ]” (alteration added)).
153. See Claudia G. Catalano, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional
Sports, 79 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2013) (commenting that although claims arising dur-
ing discussions between leagues and players’ associations remain free from anti-
trust litigation, if conduct falls outside of collective bargaining process, that
conduct is not protected).
154. See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1233-34 (noting atypical relationship
exists between players unions, franchises and league offices). “For example, to
have [a professional league’s] season, the individual [league’s] teams must agree
on the rules of the actual game, schedules, mechanisms for signing and trading
players, and other terms and conditions of employment.”  Feldman I, supra note
114, at 1233-34 (footnote omitted) (citing North Am. Soccer Leagues v. Nat’l La-
bor Relations Bd., 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980)).
155. See id. at 1238 (noting non-statutory exemption generally works to pro-
tect collective bargaining agreement terms and negotiations between players and
owners).
156. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 115, at 415-16 (discussing applicability R
of statutory exemption); Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351
F. Supp. 462, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (noting that dominant case law “involved situa-
tions where the union had been sued for its active, conspiratorial role in re-
straining competition of a product market, and the union, not the employer,
sought to invoke the labor exemptions[ ]”).
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sports leagues.157  To determine whether a professional sports
league may apply the non-statutory labor exemption, courts use a
three-prong test.158  The test requires: (1) “[T]he restraint on trade
primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining” agree-
ment, (2) the issue “concerns a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining[,]” and (3) the issue “is the product of bona-fide arm’s
length bargaining.”159  Application of Section Six through either
exemption does not automatically overcome Sherman Act viola-
tions.160  Rather, courts are inclined to apply one of three forego-
ing antitrust tests to assess the overall conduct in question.161
V. NHL’S PROPOSED ACTIONS WOULD VIOLATE ANTITRUST LAW
If the NHL prohibits players from participating in future Olym-
pics and institutes the Hockey World Cup as a substitute tourna-
ment, the NHL will be in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.162  The IOC, the IIHF, or NBC could each
157. See WONG, supra note 27, at 490 (“[T]he courts found that unions have: R
1.  An implied labor exemption from antitrust laws to enter into contracts with
multiemployer bargaining units.  2. The right to advance legitimate employee
goals that restrain trade no more than is necessary to achieve those goals.” (altera-
tion added) (citing collective holdings from Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.
3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965))).
158. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).  In Mackey, NFL
players challenged a rule mandating NFL teams to pay compensatory cash and
draft picks to a players’ former team upon signing the player as a free agent. See id.
at 609, 609 nn.1-2.  The court in Mackey determined that the NFL was restricting
the free movement of players among teams by penalizing teams for any free agent
acquisition. See id. at 615.  The league raised the non-statutory exemption to
demonstrate that the NFLPA bargained for the issue and had the opportunity to
change the rule through the bargaining process. See id. at 613.  The court dis-
agreed with the application of the exemption, holding that the NFLPA would not
be able to bargain the clause out of the agreement, and that the league held the
vast majority of bargaining power. See id. at 615-16.
159. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at 616 (holding NFL failed to prove
the third prong by obtaining  position of unfair power over the players). See also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)  (defining arm’s-length as “[o]f or relating
to dealings between two parties who are not related or not on close terms and who
are presumed to have roughly equal bargaining power; not involving a confidential
relationship” (alteration added)).
160. See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1235 (“These agreements among the
teams are subject to scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The role of
section 1—and antitrust law in general—is to act as a gatekeeper, ferreting out
anticompetitive conduct.” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
161. For a discussion of the different tests courts apply, see supra notes 129- R
147 and accompanying text. R
162. For a discussion of Section One and Two of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
see supra notes 112-128 and accompanying text. R
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bring a claim against the League.163  Any of the entities could argue
that the NHL has monopolistic power over the relevant product
and market of elite players and, through the use of anti-competitive
and predatory tactics, the market as a whole.164  Furthermore, if the
NHL plead a Clayton exemption or single-entity defense it would
be unsuccessful because third parties are affected and courts are
unlikely to view the NHL as a single-entity.165
For the NHL to successfully prohibit players from attending
future Olympics, the League would first need to ratify the 2012
CBA in coordination with the NHLPA.166  If both the players’ asso-
ciation and the NHL agree to forgo future participation, then the
IOC and IIHF would be have no authority to compel players to at-
tend.167  However, it remains unlikely that such an agreement
163. For a discussion of the argument and rationale supporting claims, see
infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text. R
164. See WONG, supra note 27, at 455-57, 456-57 nn.1-4 (noting leagues cannot R
unreasonably restrain competition through application of monopoly power). See
also Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (hereinafter “CBOT”).  In CBOT, the Court stated the following to describe
the rule of reason test:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the rea-
son for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.  For a discussion of why the NHL would fail under the framework of this
test, see infra notes 174-198 and accompanying text. R
165. For a discussion why the NHL would fail the single entity and non-statu-
tory exemption, see infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text. R
166. See NHL 2012 CBA § 24.5, supra note 57, at 156  (leaving absent, ex- R
pressly, any information binding the NHL and players to future international tour-
naments, including the Olympics); see also Nicholas Cotsonika, NHL vs. Olympics:
Going to Games is Treat for Players, Troubling for Owners, YAHOOSPORTS (Feb. 7, 2014),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nhl—nhl-vs—olympics—going-to-games-is-treat-
for-players—troubling-for-owners-174829606.html (quoting former NHL player
Tomas Kaberle as stating “I think all players are always going to push for the Olym-
pics . . . . [t]hat’s why we’ve got the union.  They’re always going to stay behind
us.”).
167. See NHL Casts Doubt on Sending Players to 2018, PC2018.COM, http://
pc2018.com/news/nhl-casts-doubt-on-sending-players-to-2018-olympics/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 26 2014) (reporting following quote of NHLPA executive director Don
Fehr: “The union isn’t convinced the Olympic participation should end . . .
[t]here are a whole bunch of players who want to play. . . .”); see also Ansar Khan,
Should the NHL participate in 2018 Winter Olympics? Many Red Wings Say Positives Out-
weigh the Risks, MICH.LIVE MEDIA GRP. http://www.mlive.com/redwings/index.ssf/
2014/02/should_the_nhl_participate_in.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2014, 2:01 PM)
(quoting Johan Franzen, NHL player for the Detroit Red Wings, as opining that
“all the players want to go there.  It’s a little bit of a break for the league . . . but I
28
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would occur, as the majority of NHL players enjoy the Olympic
hockey break and relish the opportunity to play for their coun-
tries.168  For the roughly six hundred NHL players not participating
in the Games, the two-week-long break affords them the opportu-
nity to recover from mid-season injuries and rest before the second
half of the NHL season.169
Any League attempt to stop the players’ involvement in future
Olympics could be disregarded by the players, as it is not currently
part of the 2012 CBA.170 Players could participate without NHL
consent; however, the League would likely impose stiff fines and
penalties for a player’s unexcused absence and insubordination.171
Without the NHLPA’s agreement, the NHL would be acting unilat-
erally to stop future participation.172
The player prohibition, coupled with the reinstitution of the
Hockey World Cup, demonstrates how the NHL would violate the
Sherman Act.  This argument will be articulated in the following
think they should continue doing what they’ve been doing because it’s a big deal
to win that gold.” (alteration in original)).
168. See Chuck Gormley, Should NHL Players Go To South Korea in 2018?,CSN
WASH. (Feb 22, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.csnwashington.com/hockey-wash-
ington-capitals/talk/should-nhl-players-go-south-korea-2018 (reporting following
quote of Washington Capitals defenseman John Erksine: “I think the Olympics is
supposed to be the best athletes in every sport. . . . The NHL has the majority of
the best players, so yeah, they should [go].  I think NHL players should be in every
Olympics. I think if you ask the majority of the guys, they want to go.” (alterations
in original)); see also Larry, supra note 1, at 18A (polling of NHLPA players showed R
95% of players support Olympic participation).
169. See Gormley, supra note 168.  Gormley reported the following statement R
of Washington Capitals defenseman Karl Alzner:
The guys who have the chance to play in the Games love it. . . .  And for
the guys who aren’t that [sic] get a chance to get 10 days off, it’s unbeliev-
able. Going into that break a lot of guys were feeling tired. You usually
have that All-Star break for four days, so having this is great for the guys
playing and great for the guys who aren’t playing.
Id.
170. See Delessio, supra note 85 (“[T]he league and the players association R
would have to agree on participation in any tournament—which means the status
quo [allowing Olympic participation] would still have to be an option.”).
171. See Larry, supra note 1, at 18A (arguing significant number of NHL play- R
ers would be willing to play in Olympics regardless of NHL’s stance on abstaining
from games).
172. See Gormley, supra note 168.  Gormley reported the following statement R
of Washington Capital’s wingman Brooks Laich:
I don’t think I ever understand the owners’ side of it . . . .  I play the game
because I love it . . . .  If I . . .  get the call to play for Canada I’m going.
You’re going to play just as hard for your [NHL] team when you get back.
I can’t look at it from an owner’s standpoint. It’s not an investment for us.
We play this game because we love it. Of course it’s a living for us, but to
play for your country in the Olympics, man, it’s a special honor.
Id. (fourth alteration in original).
29
O'Neill: Power Play: Why NHL's Prohibition on Player Participation in Futu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 136 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 136 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS106.txt unknown Seq: 30 31-MAR-15 12:42
256 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 227
form: (I) The applicable test is the rule of reason analysis, (II) the
NHL dominates the relevant market of professional players, (III)
there was an agreement between the NHL and the NHL’s club
members, and the agreement adversely affects the competitive mar-
ket, (IV) the monopoly power over the market and the creation of a
substitute Hockey World Cup demonstrates predatory tactics, and
(V) the harm to the NHL would be minimal compared to the detri-
ment to the IOC, IIHF, and NBC.173
A. Applicable Test
A court would likely apply the rule of reason approach to an
antitrust challenge brought by the IIHF, IOC or NBC.174  The rule
of reason test is applied when conduct is not per se invalid or clearly
anticompetitive; rather, it “is used to determine ‘whether the chal-
lenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition.”175  The majority of Sherman Act claims
are brought under this test due to its flexible nature in market defi-
nition, and the ambiguity of certain conduct.176  Courts will not ap-
ply the per se invalid standard of review because refusing the IOC
and IIHF access to NHL players, and creating a substitute interna-
tional tournament for the NHL’s profit, are not facially invalid or
anticompetitive.177  Moreover, the quick look analysis will not apply
173. For an in depth discussion of this summary, see infra Section V(A)-(F).
174. For a discussion of the difference between the application of the per se
approach and rule of reason, see supra notes 129-147 and accompanying text. R
175. See Feldman II, supra note 124, at 840-41  (citing Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l R
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).  See also LaRocca, supra note 135, R
at 92-93 (discussing rule of reason).
A rule of reason test examines the possible pro-competitive effects of anti-
competitive actions.  If the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-com-
petitive effects, the court should not find an antitrust violation. As anti-
trust law has evolved, courts have broken the rule of reason down into a
“full-blown” test, which carefully analyzes “power, purpose and effects
issues[.]”
Id. (alteration added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting KEITH N.
HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 129 n.30
(Cambridge University Press 2003)).
176. See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1245. Feldman argues that “[t]he Rule
of Reason is the primary test for determining the legality of restraints under . . . the
Sherman Act.” See id. at 1248 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
177. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-03
(holding rule of reason analysis applicable because professional sports leagues ex-
ist in a gray area of antitrust legality due to the inherent need for some coopera-
tion and coordination between the league office and member clubs). See also
Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1234-5 (arguing that application of rule of reason
suggests “restraint is unreasonable if its anticompetitive effects outweigh its pro-
competitive benefits—if it is net anticompetitive” (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885)).
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol22/iss1/6
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 137 Side A      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 137 Side A      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS106.txt unknown Seq: 31 31-MAR-15 12:42
2015] NHL’S PROHIBITION ON OLYMPIC PARTICIPATION 257
because it is typically reserved for conduct that involves obvious and
questionable anticompetitive actions without adequate defensive
justification.178  In the present situation, the NHL would attempt to
defend the questionable conduct, as a protective business decision,
to guard the League’s primary assets: the players.179
To demonstrate that the rule of reason analysis applies, the
claimant organizations would need to meet the standards of
proof.180  To demonstrate a Section 1 violation, the claimant must
show “[t]here is an agreement between two separate entities[,] . . . .
[t]he agreement adversely affects competition in a relevant mar-
ket[,] [and t]he anticompetitive effects of the agreement outweigh
the procompetitve effects.”181  The less stringent Section Two analy-
sis dictates only that a dominant league may not use predatory tac-
tics to eliminate all competing organizations through the use of its
monopoly power over a relevant market.182
B. Same Relevant Market
To establish a violation of either Section of the Sherman Act,
the NHL, IOC and IIHF must first compete in similar relevant mar-
kets.183  Furthermore the agreement or conduct in question must
178. See Oliver, supra note 144, at 40 (discussing burden of production). R
Most commonly, if a plaintiff can establish that a particular restraint is
“inherently suspect” because it is of a type that always or almost always
tends to harm competition, a [quick-look] analysis permits the plaintiff to
satisfy its initial burden of production without presenting evidence that
the defendant’s challenged conduct caused or is likely to cause actual
harm to competition.
Id. (alteration added).
179. See Delessio, supra note 85 (explaining value of player contracts at the R
Olympics as over $2.1 billion).  Delessio goes on to describe and discuss the NHL’s
best possible argument:
[T]he savvy way for the NHL to frame the discussion . . . . [is to suggest]
[t]here’s a dollar figure mentioned, but the underlying issue when
presented this way is one of player safety. When the league gives up its
players, there’s the risk they may not return as healthy as they were when
they left.
Id.
180. See WONG, supra note 27, at 454 (noting Section One analysis particularly R
involves group boycotts, and “agreements that fix, control, raise, lower, maintain,
or stabilize the prices charged for products or services”).
181. See id. at 454 (discussing burden of proof).
182. See MICHAEL COZZILLIO, SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 487 (2ND ED.
2007) (noting blocking entrance into a market or unfairly eliminating all compet-
ing leagues constitutes Section Two violation).
183. See Timothy S. Bolen, Singled Out: Application And Defense of Antitrust Law
and Single Entity Status To Non-Team Sports, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 80, 84
n.28 (2010) (noting “Extra-league actions can occur when a rival or start-up league
challenges a dominant league because it has monopolistic control over the mar-
ket. . . . To succeed in such a suit the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a
31
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adversely affect the competition within that relevant market.184  In
Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club Inc., the
World Hockey Association, a minor hockey league unaffiliated with
the existing NHL, filed Sherman Act violations against the NHL
over its contractually binding clause that prohibited all players from
playing in any lower level professional league.185  The Court held
that the NHL had a monopoly over the supply of professional play-
ers and could not prohibit those players from ever playing in com-
petitor leagues.186  The court reasoned the following:
The National Hockey League itself was primarily responsi-
ble for devising and perpetuating a monopoly over the
product market of all professional hockey players via the
reserve system.  [For] [n]ot only did [the NHL] enforce
and implement its restraints against players . . . but . . . it
sought to enforce [the restraint clause] against outside
competitors who wanted to enter the competition at the
professional level.187
Pursuant to Philadelphia, a claim against the NHL defines the
relevant market as the top-level professional ice hockey players,
over whom the NHL has sole access.188
monopoly over a defined market and acted improperly in obtaining the monop-
oly” (alteration added) (citations omitted) (citing GARY R. ROBERTS, PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, in THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 135,
136 (Paul D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., Univ. Illinois Press 1991))).
184. See WONG, supra note 27, at 454-56 (acknowledging courts’ definitions of R
relevant markets vary based on product or service).
185. See Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating growth of NHL from its inception in 1917 sub-
jects it to Sherman Antitrust laws, for “despite . . . the glory of the sport of hockey
and the grandeur of its superstars, the basic factors here are not the sheer exhilara-
tion from observing the speeding puck, but rather the desire to maximize the avail-
able buck”).
186. See id. at 500 (noting startup World Hockey Association wanted to use
reserves from NHL franchises as a means to attract a higher level of talent to new
league). The league managers argued a gross disparity existed between the NHL’s
reserves and the rest of the talent pool from which to choose the applicable per-
sonnel. See id.
187. Id. at 500. See also id. at 500-05 (stating although Court ruled in favor of
NHL regarding need for ‘reserve’ clause, league could not bind players in
perpetuity for entire lengths of their playing careers). Allowing the NHL to forbid
the players from ever signing with a fledgling competing league would ensure a
monopolistic power. See id.
188. See generally American Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 323 F.2d
124 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding necessary to prove relevant market before consider-
ing whether monopolistic control could be questioned). In American, the Court
determined the NFL and new emerging AFL competed not simply for players but
for television rights, spectators, and sponsorships. See id.
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In a suit by the IOC, IIHF and NBC, the claimant’s application
of the market test analysis would emphasize how the NHL domi-
nates the market for all professional ice hockey players.189  The IOC
and IIHF rely on access to the relevant market of elite NHL ice
hockey players.190  Unlike a competing world professional league
like Russia’s KHL, which can groom talent separately and offer sala-
ries somewhat comparable to those of the NHL, the non-profit IOC
and IIHF have no financial incentives to offer players.191  To illus-
trate this point, in the “2014 Sochi Olympics the men’s ice hockey
tournament . . . feature[d] 149 NHL players who made a combined
$629.74 million [in salary].”192  In contrast the IOC—which gener-
ates substantial revenue through fundraising, marketing, advertis-
ing and broadcasting partnerships—“distributes over 90% of its
revenues to organisations throughout the Olympic Movement to
support the staging of the Olympic Games and to promote the
worldwide development of sport.  The IOC retains less than 10% of
its revenue for the operational and administrative costs of gov-
erning the Olympic Movement.”193  The operational and adminis-
trative costs, for the 2009-2012 quadrennial Olympic cycle was
projected at $800 million.194  This means that, in a four-year period,
the costs to operate the entire IOC would scarcely cover the NHL
player salaries alone for the 2014 games.195  Incapable of luring
players fiscally, the IOC and IIHF rely on national pride to draw
athletes.196 Therefore, any NHL constraint on the relevant market
of players will force the IOC and IIHF to use inferior talent to the
Games’ detriment because the IOC would have no means to com-
189. See WONG, supra note 27, at 476 (noting NHL control over vast majority R
of professional hockey talent).
190. See id.
191. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, ELIGIBILITY RULES OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, ARTICLE 26, available at http://www.olympic.org/
Documents/Olympic%20Charter/Olympic_Charter_through_time/1964-Olympic
_Charter_Eligibility_Rules_of_the_IOC.pdf  (noting athletes may not receive pay-
ment to participate in games).
192. See Stephen Pettigrew, 2014 Sochi Olympics: Why Canada Will Rule (Again)
in Hockey, WSJONLINE (Feb. 7, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52702304450904579367082662376324 (discussing professionally salaries of players
who participate in Olympic hockey tournament).
193. See Revenue Sources and Distribution, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic
.org/ioc-financing-revenue-sources-distribution (last visited October 28, 2014)
(discussing IOC’s finance and operational structure).
194. See Lubin & Blackstone, supra note 68 (discussing Olympic earnings for R
IOC).
195. See id. (discussing earnings and operations of IOC).
196. See id. (“Around 70% goes to the Summer and Winter Olympic Organiz-
ing Committees . . . 20% goes to athlete organizations . . . 10% pays for operations
at the IOC”).
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pensate the professional players.197  Following a finding that com-
petitors act in the same relevant market, a court would next
determine the type of agreement to determine whether the con-
duct violates antitrust law.198
C. Type of Agreement
1. Agreement Between Two or More Entities
The Section 1 analysis requires a showing that two or more bus-
iness entities agree or have conduct demonstrating an agreement,
which violates the Act.199  The conduct in this case would be two-
fold: (1) the agreement between the NHL teams and League offices
in not permitting NHL players to participate in the Olympics and
(2) the implementation of an NHL World Cup of Hockey.200  To
fulfill the separate entities requirement, the plaintiffs must show
that the NHL and member clubs were acting as more than two enti-
ties for the purposes of Section 1.201
In recent years, professional leagues have attempted to adopt a
‘single entity’ defense to the first requirement of multiple entities
because the leagues “share broadcast revenue, licensing revenue,
advertise collectively, and all the teams in the leagues fall under a
single administrative body.”202  Yet, courts have typically denied
professional leagues the ability to use this defense, as most teams do
not act in accordance with one another to a degree high enough to
197. See Mitchell Tierney, supra note 94 (indicating Winter Olympic Games R
represent primary showcase of hockey’s finest talent in best-on-best international
competition and removing such talent imposes significant burden on IOC and
IIHF).
198. See e.g., Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 472 (E.D. Pa. 1972)  (“There is sufficient disparity between major
league professional hockey on the one hand and minor professional league and
amateur hockey on the other to distinguish the former from the latter.”).
199. See COZZILLIO, supra note 119, at 253-55 (“Section One requires an agree- R
ment –there must be two separate persons or entities engaged in joint conduct for
a violation of section 1 to occur.”).
200. For a discussion of the plan to disallow further NHL participation in the
Olympics and the recreation of the World Cup of Hockey, see supra notes 84-98 R
and accompanying text.
201. See WONG, supra note 27 at 454 (stating “the plaintiff must show that R
there was a combination between parties, that the two parties acted in concert, and
that they engaged in a conspiracy”).
202. See id. at 498 (implying if sports league can successfully argue application
of single entity defense then league would be unable to fulfill Section One element
requiring multiple entities).
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warrant single entity status.203  Therefore, the NHL would likely fail
to claim a single entity defense; thereby, satisfying the first step.204
2. Agreement Affects Competition
The agreement would adversely affect competition because the
IOC and IIHF have no equal market alternatives to substitute for
the revenue loss from NHL player absences.205  The NHL might be
able to justify the restraint as necessary to prevent possible player
injuries, and to diminish the profit loss incurred from missing sev-
eral midseason weeks every four years.206  Yet, the IOC and IIHF,
which gained an estimated $150 million from the ice hockey tour-
nament in 2010, would fail to earn the majority of that revenue
without NHL players.207  The IOC commissioner commented that,
if the NHL were to reap the entire value of that $150 million, the
League’s revenue sharing system would provide merely $5 million
to each team, an insubstantial sum in comparison to the whole reve-
nue generated by the IOC.208  Therefore, the discrepancy in profit
loss demonstrates that, although the justifications for the NHL
might have merit, the restraint cannot be justified as necessary for
203. See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l. Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 199
(holding although NFL club teams “depend upon a degree of cooperation for
economic survival” that “does not mean the necessity of cooperation transforms
concerted action into independent action”).
204. See Timothy S. Bolen, Singled Out: Application and Defense of Antitrust Law
and Single Entity Status to Non-Team Sports, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 80, at
87 (2010) (“Most courts have denied the National Football League (“NFL”), Na-
tional Basketball Association (“NBA”), and Major League Soccer (“MLS”) single
entity status.” (footnote omitted) (citing Los Angles Mem’l Soliseum Comm’n v.
Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984))).
205. See Tierney, supra note 94 (“It may not be even close to the most popular R
global team sport at the Olympic Games, but ice hockey is almost certainly the best
they have to offer.  Losing its fast-paced action would be a significant blow for the
Winter Olympics.”).
206. See Stu Hackel, Olympic Ire, SPORTSONEARTH, http://www.sportsonearth
.com/article/68286830/nhl-owners-questioning-future-participation-in-olympics
(last visited Feb 27, 2014) (“In addition to the risk of player injury and their poten-
tial mental and physical fatigue, [Jeremy Jacobs, NHL chairman of League’s Board
of Governer’s], referenced the extended shutdown and how it impacts fans and
corporate partners . . . . [h]e also noted the necessarily compressed NHL
schedule.”).
207. See id. (implying Olympic revenue correlated to crowd interest in seeing
NHL players); Tierney, supra note 94 (“The undoubtable [sic] affect on the altera- R
tion of hockey’s talent pool would be immense, something that can’t be said for
any other team Olympic sport.”).
208. See Kerry Gillespie, supra note 13 (quoting IIHF President Rene Fassel as R
stating the following: “What is $5 million for an NHL team? For me, it’s a lot of
money, for them it’s zero, nothing, maybe petty cash”).
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the welfare of the league and the consumer.209  Consequently the
restraint affects competition, and while minimally impacting the
NHL, would severely diminish the Olympic product.210
D. Unlawful Monopolization
Section 2 of the Sherman Act analysis requires only the unilat-
eral monopolization of a market through a single entities action.211
A challenge under Section 2 applies so long as the defendant is
guilty of unlawful monopolization of the relevant market.212  The
goal of Section 2 is to “prohibit acquiring or maintaining a monop-
oly position by exclusionary, unfair, or predatory means.”213  In
Philadelphia, the Court held the NHL had a monopoly over the new
upstart WHA because the League “overwhelmingly control[ed] the
supply of hockey players . . . available to play in any major profes-
sional league.”214  As the market discussion exhibits, the IOC has
no direct league or comparable ability to employ top-level talent,
and must rely on the participation of NHL professionals.215  Al-
though it is acceptable for a league to have a lawful monopoly over
a relevant market, the professional league may not employ tactics to
dissuade competitors from joining the market or stymie the growth
of a competitor through predatory tactics.216
The NHL’s mandate prohibiting NHL players from participat-
ing in the Games would be the first demonstration of predatory
tactics.217  The NHL would unfairly apply its leverage as employer
209. See Hackel, supra note 206 (providing that there is substantial corollary R
between NHL participation in the Olympic games over previous twenty years and
increased fan interest in NHL regular season).  Any financial harm alleged by the
NHL would be offset by the contrasting support demonstrating league actually
benefits from Olympic tournament exposure. See id.
210. For a discussion of the financial consequences and disparate harm, see
supra notes 99-111 and see infra notes 227-233 and accompanying text. R
211. See WONG, supra note 27, at 455 (noting Section Two analyses between R
inter-league disputes more commonly benefit new challenging league).
212. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) (“Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”)
213. See COZZILLIO, supra note 119, at 301-10. R
214. See generally Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (noting new American Hockey League did not
have access to professional talent due to lack of quality skilled players).
215. For a discussion of the relevant market of professional players and the
impact on the IOC and IIHF, see supra notes 183-198 and accompanying text. R
216. For a discussion of examples of predatory tactics, see supra note 128. R
217. See Catalano, supra note 153, § 65 (“When one has acquired a natural R
monopoly by means which are not exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory . . . he is not
disempowered to defend his position fairly.” (alteration added)).
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to elite professional hockey players to the detriment of the Olympic
organizations, NBC, and the consumer.218  This action is contrary
to the fundamental objective of antitrust law, which restricts en-
trenched organizations from stemming the rise of a smaller com-
petitor’s products.219
The second example of a predatory tactic would be the crea-
tion of the World Cup of Hockey as an alternative international
tournament.220  If the League prohibits its players from participat-
ing in the Olympic Games and subsequently coordinates the
Hockey World Cup for the League’s own fiscal benefit, the NHL
would be taking advantage of its monopoly over the relevant mar-
ket.221  NHL player involvement would enhance the World Cup
while diminishing Olympic Hockey.222  This demonstration of mar-
ket power would be impermissible, for the League cannot apply the
monopoly power in a predatory manner.223
218. See generally Lake, supra note 3 (stating NHL might only permit IOC R
player attendance at future Olympics if IOC agrees to widespread media access for
NHL).
219. See WONG, supra note 27, at 456 (discussing policy objectives of antitrust R
law).
220. For a discussion of the plan to create the World Cup of Hockey, see supra
notes 84-98 and accompanying text. R
221. See WONG, supra note 27, at 472 (providing that league with monopoly R
power over a product cannot use that power to exclude competitors access to the
market).
222. See Michael Peckerar, 2014 Winter Olympics Are Good For NHL, RANTIN-
SPORTS, http://www.rantsports.com/nhl/2014/01/15/2014-winter-olympics-are-
good-for-nhl/ (last visited Jan 15, 2014) (stating the 2010 Vancouver games drew
the largest TV audience ever for Olympic ice hockey as a result of NHL player
involvement: the game drew several million more viewers than the historic ‘Mira-
cle on Ice’ 1980 gold medal game between the United States and Russia); INTERNA-
TIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE GLOBAL
TELEVISION REPORT MAY 2006, available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/
Reports/EN/en_report_1087.pdf (noting 80% of Canada’s television viewers
watched part of Canadian medal games in Torino, Italy).  Similarly, during the
Canadian men’s gold medal game 85% of market shares for television in Sweden
watched to see the team win the gold medal. See id.
223. See Catalano, supra note 153, § 65 at 1, (discussing Phila. World Hockey R
Club v. Phila. Hockey Club Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“[T]he
NHL . . . had willfully acquired and maintained arrangements by which it over-
whelmingly controls the supply of players who are capable and available for play in
a new league where the level of internal competitions fairly approaches the levels
currently existing in the NHL.” (alteration added)).
[In] such arrangements, including contracts and agreements with minor
league, amateur, and semiprofessional hockey teams and league organi-
zations, which . . . had the effect of maintaining the NHL’s control of
players [through the use of such anticompetitive contracts,] the court
held that the control thus demonstrated was so probably violative of § 2
of the Sherman Act that it should preliminarily enjoin the NHL from
further . . . enforcing the [anticompetitive] reserve clause of its standard
player contract.
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The NHL’s final predatory tactic involves using its monopoly
power to exert dominion over the IOC’s sponsorship and media
rights.224  Although the League and partner station, the NHL Net-
work, were granted unprecedented access to the Sochi Olympic
games, the League offices and team owners would require an en-
hanced partnership between the League, IOC and NBC, for all fu-
ture player participation.225  By withholding player participation
until the IOC and NBC alter the existing sponsorship and media
rights, the League is abusing its financial leverage over the market
of players to assert its dominance over the IOC.226
E. The Harm is Dissimilar
Although the Sherman Act does not require proof of harm,
courts will look to the conduct’s harmful effects to determine if an
action was necessary or justifiable within the realm of professional
sports.227  The harm to the IOC, IIHF, and NBC is far greater than
the relative harm incurred by the NHL caused by pausing its season
for two weeks during Olympic years.228  The NHL loses marginal
revenue during the small time frame, and still maintains large prof-
its despite the games.229  However, the preclusion of elite players
will fundamentally alter the makeup of the Olympic ice hockey
tournament and severely diminish IOC, IIHF and NBC profits.230
Id. (citations omitted).
224. See Lake, supra note 3 (stating NHL given increased media access to the R
Sochi games in show of good faith by IOC and IIHF).  Lake also notes that media
access is difficult to obtain because of the stringent rights that certain sponsors
have for Winter and Summer Olympics. See id.
225. See Lake, supra note 3 (“While the details of the agreement are not pub- R
lic, it is clear that the NHL and NHLPA sought an agreement, which would allow
the NHL Network greater rights than a typical broadcaster who does not hold the
broadcasting rights from IOC.”).
226. See generally United States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842
F.2d 1335 (2d. Cir 1988)  (holding dominant league that imposes burdens on
sponsors for dealing with new upstart league unlawful).
227. See Feldman I, supra note 114, at 1276 (suggesting “it follows that re-
straints that interfere with the efficient allocation of players and hamper competi-
tive balance are anticompetitive and have the ability to harm the product and
consumers” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
228. See Joe Pelletier, Sochi Last Olympics for NHL?,GREATESTHOCKEYLEGENDS
.COM, http://www.greatesthockeylegends.com/2014/02/sochi-last-olympics-for-
nhl.html (last visited March 12, 2014) (“It would . . . be a [substantial] loss for the
International Olympic Committee.  Losing NHL players in the Winter Olympics’
most valuable property would be a huge blow, with loss of sponsorships, ratings
and television contract dollars to match.”).
229. See id. (stating more people watched the 2010 Olympic Hockey tourna-
ment than the 2010 Super Bowl).
230. For a discussion of the economic ramifications and profit implications,
see supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text. R
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Moreover, interest in the Olympics increases fan and player aware-
ness of the game, which boosts hockey’s global appeal and may
demonstrate why the NHL has gained popularity over the past two
decades.231
Therefore, the final element of the antitrust analysis suggests
the anticompetitive effects stemming from (1) the NHL’s prohibi-
tion against player participation, and (2) creation of an NHL spon-
sored Hockey World Cup, outweigh the precompetitive effects.232
The NHL may have business justifications, namely gaining profits
missed during the Olympic break, preventing injuries caused at the
Olympics, and avoiding stoppage of the regular season schedule;
however, the League cannot employ the intended predatory tactics
to the detriment of the IOC, IIHF, and NBC.233
F. Professional Sports’ Exemptions Do Not Protect Against
NHL’s Antitrust Claims
The NHL would unsuccessfully claim a Clayton statutory or
non-statutory exemption from antitrust law.234  The statutory ex-
emption does not apply because it is inapplicable in situations not
benefiting the labor union, in this case the NHLPA.235  The non-
statutory exemption, similarly, does not apply, for the elements of
the non-statutory exemption that require the restraint on trade to
primarily affect only the parties that are involved in the collective
bargaining.236 Furthermore, the non-statutory labor exemption re-
jects the idea “that an employer can conspire with or take advan-
231. See Gloster, supra note 62 (stating league benefits from global coverage R
of Olympic hockey). See also Delessio, supra note 85, (suggesting Olympics “pro- R
vide[ ] a platform for the sport that it wouldn’t otherwise have, since the Olympics
have a built-in audience offering the kind of exposure for the sport that a Wednes-
day night NHL game on NBCSN never could[ ]”); Chris Peters, Raw Numbers:
Hockey’s Growth in the United States — 1990-2010, THE UNITED STATES OF HOCKEY
(May 23 2011), http://unitedstatesofhockey.com/2011/05/23/raw-numbers-
hockeys-growth-in-the-united-states-1990-2009/ (documenting growth of hockey
since 1990).
232. See WONG supra note 27, at 472 (“[T]o prove that a Section 1 antitrust R
violation exists, the plaintiff must show . . . the anticompetitive effects outweigh the
precompetitive effects.”).
233. See Delessio, supra note 85, (suggesting recreation of Hockey World Cup R
runs risk of ruining Olympic ice hockey tournament).  For a discussion of similar
issues existing between AFL and NFL prior to merger, see WONG, supra note 27. R
234. See supra notes 148-161 and accompanying text (discussing differences R
between statutory and non-statutory Clayton exemptions from anti-trust law).
235. See WONG, supra note 27, at 458 (“Professional sports leagues have not R
often raised the statutory exemption as a defense because the common interpreta-
tion of Section 6 of the Clayton Act is that the law was enacted solely for the bene-
fit of labor unions.”).
236. See id. at 459 (stating elements for non-statutory exemption to apply).
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tage of a union to restrain competition and seriously impair the
business dealing and transactions of competitors.”237
VI. CONCLUSION
A court will likely deem the NHL has a monopoly over the rele-
vant market of professional players and by acting in this manner the
NHL would be exerting that power to stymie competition and bol-
ster its own profits.238  The financial gain to the League and the
subsequent penalty to the IOC, the IIHF, and NBC demonstrate
that the anticompetitive result far outweighs the precompetitive ef-
fect.239  Although the League management opposes player partici-
pation, players relish the opportunity to represent their
countries.240  Thus, the decision to deviate from previous practice
and preclude NHL player participation in Olympics would be a uni-
lateral abuse of the NHL’s power.241
Were the League to successfully justify its business rationale by
citing player health and scheduling issues, the substitute World Cup
of Hockey undercuts the League’s arguments.242  Supplanting one
international tournament with another does not limit the time play-
ers spent on ice and risk of injury.243  Yet, the NHL’s interest in
controlling a tournament’s operations and reaping the profits sug-
gest the League may attempt such a unilateral action.244  This con-
237. See id. at 458 (discussing statutory labor exemption). See also id. at 491-92
(discussing development of three prong test to non-statutory exemption).
238. See Don Barrie, Enjoy Last NHL Olympics, http://www.thepeterborough
examiner.com/2014/02/21/enjoy-last-nhl-olympics (Feb. 21, 2014, 10:51 PM)
([T]he World Cup [has been] run by the NHL for the players and owners finan-
cial benefit. . . .  For these owners and Commissioner Bettman, hockey is strictly a
business.  That $5 billion deal between Rogers Communications is not about mak-
ing hockey better for fans but strictly a financial decision.”).
239. See id. (suggesting lack of NHL benefit from resurgent World Cup be-
cause “event would be played in the late summer when hockey fans have other
things on the go and the best players will be more interested in preparing them-
selves for the up-coming NHL season than making more money for NHL
owners.”).
240. See Lage, supra note 13 (discussing belief of Detroit Red Wings’ Jonas R
Gustavsson that players desire to compete and “[taking] the best hockey players
out of the Olympics would be wrong and would be a shame”).
241. See Gloster, supra note 62 (“[t]he league and players union together have R
to agree on whether [the league] will participate”).
242. See Dan Rosen, Bettman: World Cup of Hockey could return, NHL.COM (Feb.
18, 2014), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=705381 (reporting NHL Deputy
Commissioner Bill Baly as stating the following: “The World Cup is a piece of an
international presence that we want to have[.]”).
243. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing proposed World R
Cup of Hockey).
244. See James Conley, The NHL World Cup of Hockey is Coming for Your Olympics
(Tuesday Slew), BLEACHERREPORT (Feb. 11, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.pens
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duct further demonstrates the NHL’s abuse of its monopoly power
and indicates why it would ultimately fail an anticompetitive anti-
trust analysis.245
The NHL overvalues the benefits of a World Cup and would
harm its revenue by forbidding all Olympic participation.246  The
profits and popularity of sporting World Cups outside of soccer
have proven inherently weak, as demonstrated by the quadrennial
Basketball World Cup and World Baseball Classic.247  The FIBA Bas-
ketball World Cup fields a tournament structure similar to that of
the Olympics.248  Yet, even with the participation of a formidable
grouping of NBA players, only 900,000 people watched the 2010
FIBA World Cup Gold Medal game.249  By comparison, over 12.5
million viewers in the United States alone watched the United
States defeat Spain in the 2012 London Olympic gold medal basket-
ball game.250  The NBA’s multibillion-dollar net worth can be attrib-
burgh.com/2014/2/11/5400344/the-nhl-world-cup-of-hockey-is-coming-for-your-
olympics-tuesday-slew (“The NHL realizes there is prestige and marketing poten-
tial in an international tournament.”).
245. Commentator James Conley argues that the NHL is fully aware of cur-
rent successes and recognizes the marketing potential of an international tourna-
ment. See id.
NHL executives have been quietly breadcrumbing the trail from Olym-
pics to World Cup of Hockey throughout the Sochi saga. The WCOH
hasn’t taken place since 2004 and never generated the level of intrigue
that the Olympics have . . . .  an international tournament is just the place
for them to try to flex their growing marketing muscle.
Id. (alteration added).
246. See infra notes 247-259 and accompanying text (implying revenue of R
World Cup will not amount to NHL’s expectations).
247. See infra notes 247-259 and accompanying text (discussing lack of partici- R
pation and viewership of FIBA Basketball World Cup and World Baseball Classic).
248. See Competition Format, FIBA.COM http://www.fiba.com/basketballworld
cup/2014/competition-format (last visited October 25, 2014) (presenting 24-team
2014 FIBA competition format). See also Competition Format, FIBA.COM, http://lon
don2012.fiba.com/pages/eng/fe/12/olym/event-guide/p/competition_format
.html (last visited October 25, 2014) (providing breakdown of 12-team 2012
Olympic Basketball competition format).
249. See Paulson, The Ratings Game: Team USA Hoops Victory Draws Fewer Than
900,000 Viewers, SPORTS MEDIA WATCH, (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.sport-
smediawatch.com/2010/09/ratings-game-team-usa-hoops-victory/ (noting 2010
regular season NBA games averaged 1.1 million viewers); see also Durant’s With-
drawal A Body Blow Fro The FIBA World Cup, http://ballineurope.com/durants-with-
drawal-a-body-blow-for-the-fiba-world-cup/ (last visited October 27, 2014)
(“Making the world accept that FIBA gold matters more than Olympic gold is an-
other matter entirely. The fans still see the Olympics as by far the biggest deal and
so too do the players.”).
250. See Alana Glass, USA Basketball Scores High London Olympics Ratings
For NBC, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2012, 2:11 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/
alanaglass/2012/08/16/usa-basketball-scores-high-london-olympics-ratings-for-
nbc/ (“[V]iewership momentum established during the 2012 London Olympics
[would] carry into the . . . NBA’s 2012 regular season[ ]”); see also J.K., The Dream
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uted partially to the League’s expansion into the Olympics, which
began with the 1992 “Dream Team” of NBA stars.251  By including
the basketball elite in the Olympics, “America transformed the
Summer Games – basketball became one of its most-watched com-
petitions – [and] simultaneously [made] an immeasurable impact
on the NBA’s popularity worldwide.”252  In contrast, the FIBA
World Cup could not draw interest or the top NBA talent because,
similar to NHL player sentiment, for NBA players “as long as the
Olympics represent the premier international competition in top
players’ minds, alternatives will struggle to gain traction.”253  The
stagnant ratings and general disinterest stem from the player and
fan apathy towards the FIBA World Cup.254
Similarly, the World Baseball Classic, an event sponsored by
Major League Baseball, fails to capture fans’ attention, television
ratings, or revenues due to major league players’ indifference and
refusal to participate.255 The player deferrals “are a major reason
why the [World Baseball Classic] still lags significantly behind the
international tournaments of other sports in generating fan passion
and television ratings.”256  Even with the World Baseball Classic
available to them, players choose to join their club teams in spring
Tournament, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 15, 2012, 4:21 PM) http://www.economist
.com/blogs/gametheory/2012/08/basketball-olympics  (“The current scope and
popularity of professional basketball give it a case as the world’s second-most popu-
lar team sport, behind [soccer]. . .”).
251. See Jim Eichenhofer, Ten Ways David Stern Helped Grow the Game of Basket-
ball, http://www.nba.com/pelicans/news/ten-ways-david-stern-helped-grow-game-
basketball (last visited October 27, 2014)  (implying causal link between Olympic
participation and league popularity).
252. See id. (suggesting Olympics and NBA benefitted from transition to NBA
player participation).
253. See J.K., supra note 250 (arguing possible NBA transition away from R
Olympics negatively affects fans). See id. (“For fans. . .the potential loss of a vibrant
international competition is galling, especially as other countries slowly but surely
catch up with America (thanks in part to the internationalisation of NBA
rosters.”).
254. See Paul Sondhi, The World Cup is On And No One Cares, NYULOCAL (Sept.
12, 2014) http://nyulocal.com/city/2014/09/12/the-world-cup-is-on-and-no-one-
cares/  (“The reasons for this lack of interest vary from the fact that our country’s
best players are not playing in the tournament (LeBron, Kevin Durant) to the idea
that the FIBA World Cup is irrelevant and that Olympic play is the only interna-
tional basketball showcase that Americans get up for.”).
255. See Sean Gregory, World Baseball Classic: Why Doesn’t It Sizzle Like Other
Global Sports Competitions?, TIME (Mar. 6, 2013), http://keepingscore.blogs.time
.com/2013/03/05/world-baseball-classic-why-doesnt-it-sizzle-like-other-global-
sports-events/  (“[I]f more big names from the U.S. major leagues played in the
WBC, it would surely attract more domestic attention”).
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training, a likely outcome for NHL players similarly preparing for
their regular season during a September World Cup of Hockey.257
Provided the opportunity to expand the game internationally, base-
ball would gain more support and revenue if “like. . .hockey, it was
attached to the marketing machine of the Olympics.”258  The his-
tory, allure, and pride intrinsic to Olympic Games trumps the inter-
est and viewership levels of comparable sporting world cups and
serves as an indictment against the NHL’s reformation of the World
Cup of Hockey.259
To prevent the abandonment of Olympic ice hockey the IOC,
IIHF, NHL and NHLPA must come to a mutually beneficial com-
promise that provides the NHL a portion of the Olympic ice hockey
tournament profits as well as the rights to certain advertising, mar-
keting, and broadcasting fees.260  Through such a compromise, the
NHL would be inclined to advertise and support their Olympic
players throughout the upcoming NHL regular season during
Olympic years, a benefit to both the league and Olympic hockey
viewership.261  Further, the League can capitalize on the Olympic
coverage, as “every second of national broadcast coverage of
Olympic hockey is a glorified television commercial for the NHL’s
product international. . . [and] the future of the game is interna-
257. See id. (suggesting MLB players forego World Baseball Classic partially
due to timing issue). See id. (maintaining NHL preseason begins shortly after pro-
posed September date for World Cup of Hockey).
258. See Lack Of Big Names Only Part Of WBC’s “Structural Issues” In The U.S.
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2013/03/07/Events-and-Attrac-
tions/WBC.aspx?hl=Game%20Time%20Sports&sc=0 (Mar. 7, 2013).
259. For a discussion of the paucity of fan interest and enthusiasm of FIBA
Basketball World Cup and World Baseball Classic, see supra notes 237-249 and ac-
companying text.
260. See J.K., supra note 250 (implying former NBA commissioner David R
Stern’s held similar idea regarding Olympic participation while serving as commis-
sioner of NBA). See id. (suggesting Stern “appear[ed] to favour a partnership with
FIBA instead of an outright takeover of international competition by the NBA.
This would give the NBA a cut of the World Cup’s revenues, but not total control
over its organisation. For the integrity of competition, this is preferable to an NBA-
run tournament, in which team owners would surely restrict the participation of
their biggest stars.”); For a discussion of the IOC’s stringent media restrictions and
exclusive partnership deals, see supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. R
261. See Olympic Sponsorship, THE OLYMPIC MARKETING FACT FILE, International
Olympic Committee (Sep. 2001) http://info.hktdc.com/olympics/sponsorship
.htm (discussing numerous advertising and marketing benefits associated with IOC
Sponsors and Partners, including but not limited to: “use of all Olympic imagery,
as well as appropriate Olympic designations on products; direct advertising and
promotional opportunities, including preferential access to Olympic broadcast ad-
vertising; [and] Protection from ambush marketing.”).
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tional.”262  Therefore, before banning Olympic participation, the
NHL should look at the failed experiments in other professional
sports and the inherent benefits to Olympic participation as sup-
port for finding compromise.263  All parties stand to benefit from a
negotiated agreement that generates improved revenues by al-
lowing the stars to play and fans to enjoy.264
Ross O’Neill*
262. See Gloster, supra note 62, (quoting Allen Walsh, representative to 23 of R
148 NHL Olympians at Sochi).
263. For a discussion of the failures of previous World Cup Hockey tourna-
ments, see supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. R
264. For a discussion of the benefits to the various organizations, see supra
notes 260-262 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. Syracuse
University, 2011.
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